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THE ONE-YEAR BAR TO ASYLUM IN THE AGE OF THE
IMMIGRATION COURT BACKLOG
LINDSAY M. HARRIS*
Imagine being forced to flee your home, separated from your
children, and undergoing the perilous journey to seek safety and protection
in the United States. Upon arrival, you are immediately detained and
questioned about your intentions. You explain that you fear for your life
and seek asylum protection. You may even undergo a detailed interview
with an asylum officer, who finds that you have a significant possibility of
establishing asylum eligibility. You are released from detention to pursue
your asylum claim in immigration court. You diligently attend check-ins
with an Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer for the next two
years but struggle to find affordable legal representation as you await your
first court date—scheduled two years after your arrival. When you appear at
that court date, without an attorney, you learn for the first time that you
were required to file an application for asylum with the immigration court
within one year of your arrival. Your failure to do so bars you from asylum
eligibility. You are now only eligible for a lesser form of relief and will live
in limbo—you will never be reunited with your children who remain in
danger in your home country, you can never travel abroad, and you will
never become a permanent resident or a United States citizen.
This absurd situation, faced by thousands of asylum seekers
navigating our complex immigration system alone, results from the
disastrous interplay of a twenty-year-old law barring asylum for those who
do not file within one year of arrival, and an immigration court backlog
rendering compliance virtually impossible. Our immigration courts are
overwhelmed, with over 521,000 cases pending and a wait, on average, of
almost two years for an initial court hearing. More than half of the recently
arrived asylum seekers, largely women and children fleeing violence in
Central America, lack legal representation. The United States Government
provides no notice to asylum seekers of the one-year bar, practically
denying all but those with competent legal counsel a meaningful opportunity
to file within one year.
Drawing upon contemporary cases, this Article is the first to
illuminate the human costs of the one-year bar to asylum in this age of
unprecedented immigration court backlog: needless deprivation of rights
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and full protection for vulnerable children and families seeking protection in
the United States. It is also the first to analyze the Executive Office for
Immigration Review’s recent attempt to solve this problem for asylum
seekers represented by legal counsel. In doing so, the Article lays out a
detailed road map of complementary reforms and actions by each actor in
the immigration system necessary to ensure access to justice—specifically,
to provide a fair and meaningful opportunity to apply for asylum for all
asylum seekers.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the disastrous interplay between the
overburdened immigration court system and the one-year deadline to
apply for asylum for individuals fleeing persecution and seeking
protection in the United States.1 Currently, 291 immigration judges
nationwide are tasked with the adjudication of over 521,000
immigration cases.2 The number of individuals seeking asylum
1.
An asylum applicant is referred to as an “asylum seeker.” Once granted
asylum, the asylum seeker becomes an “asylee.” Asylees and refugees must meet the
same legal definition of “refugee” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012) (a refugee
is “any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion”); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.14(a)–(b) (2016).
2.
Press Release, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Executive Office for
Immigration Review Swears in Fifteen Immigration Judges, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Sep. 26, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/executive-office-immigration-reviewswears-15-immigration-judges [https://perma.cc/E7H6-ED54]; Alicia A. Caldwell,
Federal
Immigration
Court
Backlog
Tops
500,000
Pending
Cases,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS:
THE
BIG
STORY
(July
20,
2016),
http://bigstory.ap.org/7b1dc1cdb32740d18ad9c658ebce5f43&utm_source=android_app
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protection is at a record high.3 A humanitarian crisis in the Central
American countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador has
resulted in unprecedented numbers of unaccompanied children and
families seeking protection in the United States.4 Any failure by these
asylum seekers to file their applications within one year of arrival, as
required by a two-decade-old law aimed at addressing asylum fraud,5
often results in an outright bar to asylum. In a tragic twist of form over
substance, worthy asylum seekers are denied the protection of asylum
by an impossible procedural hurdle.
While scholarly critiques of the one-year deadline itself abound,
the unanticipated effect of the immigration court backlog remains
unexplored.6 Using accounts of contemporary cases, this Article is the
first to illuminate the human costs of this twenty-year-old misguided
law in this age of unprecedented immigration court backlog: the
deprivation of rights and full protection for vulnerable children and
families seeking protection in the United States.
As this Article was going to print, the Executive Office of
Immigration Review (EOIR), within the Department of Justice,
announced a policy change that will help to remedy this problem for
asylum seekers represented by competent counsel.7 Specifically, the
&utm_medium=mail&utm_campaign=share
[https://perma.cc/RMT5-PZRQ]
(reporting that according to EOIR, there are now 500,051 cases in the backlog);
Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Court as of September 2016,
TRAC
IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/
[https://perma.cc/LQ5R-U96A] (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (reflecting that 521,676
cases are currently pending in immigration court).
3.
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED
DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, at 3 (2016).
4.
JONATHON T. HISKEY ET AL., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL,
UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE CRISIS 1 (2016).
5.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see id. § 1225 note (GAO Study on
Operation of Expedited Removal Procedures).
6.
The phenomenon was mentioned in a detailed report to the Administrative
Conference of the United States in 2012, but has not been explored in depth. Lenni B.
Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Enhancing Quality and Timeliness in Immigration
Removal Adjudication, 41 (draft report prepared for the consideration of the
Administrative
Conference
of
the
United
States)
(June
7,
2012),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Enhancing-Quality-and-Timelinessin-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3DDKXF4] (“We also heard some anecdotal reports that in Texas and several other courts,
individuals who are subject to expedited removal seek protection at the border, are
paroled (released from detention) into the U.S. and pass a credible fear interview yet
missed the one year filing deadline because the busy immigration courts could not hear
their cases within the time deadline. These pro se applicants did not know they needed
to press the court for an earlier hearing date due to the court’s rule requiring both a
hearing to allow the in-person filing of an application for asylum.”).
7.
Memorandum from Michael C. McGoings, Chief Immigration Judge
(Acting), U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Immigration Judges et al. (Sept. 14, 2016),
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Chief Immigration Judge issued a memorandum instructing immigration
judges to find that asylum applications filed at the court window, rather
than in open court, should be considered filed for the purposes of
meeting the one-year filing deadline.8 Thus, an asylum seeker who has
knowledge that she does not have to wait to file their asylum
application at her court hearing, which may be scheduled more than a
year into the future, can preserve her asylum eligibility by filing her
asylum application at the court window. If followed by corresponding
reforms from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) and further EOIR action, the recent EOIR policy change could
form part of a constellation of solutions for a significant portion of
asylum seekers. Absent additional reforms, however, the policy change
risks deepening the unfair disparity in treatment of represented and
unrepresented asylum seekers. Asylum seekers without counsel remain
at risk of losing their asylum eligibility en masse. This disaster in the
making is as avoidable as it is unjust, and this Article presents road
maps for each actor in the immigration system to prevent serious
consequences for asylum seekers.
Part I offers a brief overview of the asylum system in the United
States, examines the creation of the one-year bar twenty years ago,
explores prior critiques of the bar, and explains why asylum relief is so
important. Part II surveys the current state of our overwhelmed
immigration court system and explains the current crisis of legal
representation for asylum seekers. Part III analyzes the recently issued
EOIR policy change, modifying the mechanics for filing an asylum
application in immigration court, and explains how this change fails to
ensure the rights of pro se asylum seekers, offering two case studies of
asylum seekers barred from asylum by the interplay of the backlog and
the one-year bar. Part III also explains the measures attorneys were
previously taking to protect their clients and the pending class action
lawsuit aiming to hold the various government agencies accountable for
the failure to remedy this problem. Finally, Part IV proposes a
complementary set of solutions to this mounting crisis, identifying
actions within reach of each actor in the immigration system. Part IV
ultimately argues that EOIR and USCIS must undertake further
administrative and regulatory reforms to ensure that all asylum seekers,
whether represented by competent counsel or pro se, have a meaningful
opportunity to meet the one-year filing deadline.

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/09/14/oppm_1601.pdf [https://perma.cc/39FN-ZRYV].
8.
Id.
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I. ASYLUM AND THE ONE-YEAR FILING DEADLINE
A. Paths to Seeking Asylum

Asylum seekers are individuals forced to flee their countries
because they fear or have suffered persecution on account of their race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular
social group.9 There are three distinct paths to seeking asylum in the
United States. The first is known as “affirmative” asylum, meaning that
an individual is already within United States’ borders and takes the
initiative to affirmatively file an application for asylum. These
individuals may be undocumented, living in the United States without
status, or often they have entered on a visa, a tourist or student visa for
example, which has or will expire. USCIS adjudicates these affirmative
asylum claims through a non-adversarial interview with an asylum
officer at one of eight asylum offices or sub-offices nationwide.10 The
asylum officer may grant the asylum application, or refer an
undocumented individual to immigration court for removal
proceedings, where they may continue to pursue their application for
asylum before an immigration judge.
The second path to seeking asylum is where an individual is
already living within the United States and is placed into “removal
proceedings” and files her application as a defense to deportation from
the country before an immigration judge in immigration court, under
the EOIR.11
The third path—really a subset of defensive claims, but a category
that merits mentioning in its own right—includes the increasing
numbers of individuals subjected to “expedited removal.” Congress
created the expedited removal system, along with the one-year
deadline, in 1996.12 In general, the expedited removal system is
intended to allow for a streamlined removal process for recent entrants
at or near the border. The use of expedited removal has rapidly
9.

The Immigration and Nationality Act defines a refugee as:

[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . .
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965 § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42) (2012).
10.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(b)(1), (2), (5) (2016).
11.
Id. § 1208.4(b)(3)–(4).
12.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(I) (2012) (setting up the expedited
removal system).
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expanded since its initial implementation. Originally, expedited removal
was only implemented at ports of entry, but expanded to beyond the
border in 2004.13 Now, expedited removal proceedings may be applied
to individuals who are apprehended within one hundred miles of the
border and are unable to establish that they have been continuously
physically present in the United States for the preceding fourteen-day
period.14
Upon encountering individuals and families who have entered the
United States, often without inspection, or who have asserted their
claim for asylum at a border patrol station, United States Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) places many of them into the expedited
removal fast-track removal process.15 Where an individual expresses a
fear of return to their home country or an intention to apply for asylum,
however, she must be referred for a “credible fear interview” with an
asylum officer.16 During this credible fear interview, an asylum seeker
must establish a significant possibility that she will establish eligibility
for asylum.17 Often, she must do so without an attorney because
immigrants do not have a right to a government-appointed attorney in
immigration proceedings,18 although they may hire one at their own
cost or through pro bono services. If the asylum officer determines that
the individual has a significant possibility of establishing eligibility for
asylum, the asylum officer issues charging documents, in the form of a
“Notice to Appear” (NTA) and places the asylum seeker into regular
removal proceedings, where she may apply for asylum as a defense to
removal.19 In recent years, the government has used expedited removal
with greater frequency; indeed, the number of credible fear interviews
generated by expedited removals has increased from 5,523 conducted in
2009 to over 65,000 just in the first nine months of the 2016 fiscal
year.20
13.
In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7210(d)(1), 118 Stat. 3852 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1225a(a)(4)).
14.
Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877 (Aug.
11, 2004).
15.
8 C.F.R. § 1235.3(b)(ii)–(iii) (2016).
16.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 253.3(b)(4) (2016).
17.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).
18.
United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012); see
8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(1)(2); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012).
20.
In fiscal year 2016, the asylum office completed 94,048 requests for
credible fear interviews. ASYLUM DIV. OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD REPORT SUMMARY: FY 2016 TOTAL CASELOAD 1
(2016),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20
Engagements/PED_CredibleFearReasonableFearStatisticsNationalityReport.pdf
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Even after establishing this initial threshold eligibility for asylum,
asylum seekers who receive a positive credible fear determination must
still file an application with the immigration court.21 If an asylum seeker
fails to file for asylum within one year of her arrival, she is barred
from asylum unless she can establish extraordinary or changed
circumstances to excuse her untimely filing.22
This Article focuses on the second and third category of asylum
seekers: those who are filing applications defensively in immigration
court, either because they were apprehended within the United States or
because they passed a credible fear interview23 and were placed in
removal proceedings.24
Regardless of the way in which asylum seekers enter the United
States or whether they are in affirmative or defensive proceedings, most
asylum seekers are required to file for asylum within one year of their
arrival.25
B. The Origins of the One-Year Bar to Asylum
Our current asylum system in the United States was created when
Congress passed the Refugee Act in 1980,26 essentially formalizing our
joining the 1967 Protocol to the Convention on the Status of Refugees,

[https://perma.cc/DS26-EPLC] (provided at the Quarterly Stakeholder Meeting on
November 4, 2016). This is a vast increase from previous years. In 2009, for example,
USCIS completed just 5,523 cases, but this number has been steadily rising with a huge
leap between 2012 (13,607) and 2013 (36,454) and a total of 49,607 in the fiscal year
2014. See ASYLUM DIV. OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CREDIBLE
FEAR WORKLOAD REPORT SUMMARY - FY 09-14, at 1 (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20E
ngagements/PED_Credible_Fear_and_Reasonable_Fear_FY14_Q4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3PL-LGV5].
21.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).
22.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2012).
23.
For an excellent overview of the expedited removal and credible fear
process, see Dree K. Collopy, Crisis at the Border, Part II: Demonstrating a Credible
Fear of Persecution or Torture, 16-04 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (Apr. 2016).
24.
Although this Article focuses on defensive, rather than affirmative claims,
the Author would note that the one-year filing deadline as it currently operates at the
affirmative level actually serves to contribute to the backlog in immigration court. The
asylum office is forced to refer cases to immigration court based on a failure to meet
the one-year deadline that it would otherwise grant. See Karen Musalo & Marcelle
Rice, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies: The Implementation of the One-Year Bar to
Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 693, 714–15 (2008).
25.
As discussed later, “unaccompanied minors” (other than those from
contiguous countries) are exempted from the one-year bar by the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, now codified at INA §
208(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(2)(E).
26.
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
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thirteen years earlier.27 It was not until 1996 that Congress created the
one-year deadline to apply for asylum, requiring all asylum seekers to
file an application within one year of their last arrival in the United
States.28 The deadline was ostensibly created to deter fraudulent asylum
filings—the concern was that individuals were filing asylum
applications solely to receive work authorization29 or to delay their

27.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954); Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into
force Oct. 4, 1967). The United States ratified the 1967 Protocol in 1968, which
incorporates most provisions of the original 1951 Convention. See UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, STATE PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO
STATUS
OF
REFUGEES
AND
THE
1967
PROTOCOL
4,
THE
http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V4X-7DTT] (last visited
Aug. 26, 2016).
28.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012) (“Subject to subparagraph (D),
paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien unless the alien demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of
the alien’s arrival in the United States.”). This was created as part of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and applies to all
asylum seekers filing for asylum after April 1, 1998. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009 (codified in various sections of 8 U.S.C.).
29.
The creation of the one-year deadline shortly followed another important
change made to asylum law by regulation. Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1) (2012),
asylum seekers may not receive work authorization until their asylum application has
been pending for 180 days. Indeed, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
(now USCIS) opposed the enactment of the one-year filing deadline. See Leena
Khandwala et al., The One-Year Bar: Denying Protection to Bona Fide Refugees,
Contrary to Congressional Intent and Violative of International Law, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS 4 (Aug. 2005) (“Significantly, the former INS itself strongly opposed the
bar. The agency had recently overhauled its asylum procedures to revoke the automatic
issuance of work authorization upon filing a non-frivolous asylum application, to allow
faster adjudication of asylum applications, and to refer claims that did not appear
meritorious to immigration courts for removal proceedings. Doris Meissner, thenCommissioner of the INS, explicitly noted that the filing deadline (which, at that time,
was proposed to be 30 days) would ‘frustrate and hamper [the agency's reform]
efforts,’ and was unnecessary in light of the agency's own efforts to crack down on
fraudulent claims.”) (internal citation omitted); Michele R. Pistone, Asylum Filing
Deadlines: Unfair and Unnecessary, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 95, 102 (1996) (citing Doris
Meisser, Comm’r of the INS, News Conferences on the Asylum Reform Effort (Jan. 4,
1996), in CQ TRANSCRIPTIONS, Jan. 6, 1996, at 1, 7 (formally FDCH Political
Transcripts)).
Several other mechanisms exist to deter and combat fraud and abuse of the
asylum system. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM FILING DEADLINE: DENYING
PROTECTION TO THE PERSECUTED AND UNDERMINING GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY
26–27
(2010),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/afd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GF4P-47NJ] (these mechanisms include applicants signing the asylum
application under penalty of perjury, prosecution of fraudulent filers, preparers, and
attorneys, layers of identity and security checks, FBI fingerprint and name analysis,
forensic testing of documents, and assistance and support for asylum officers from the
Office of Fraud Detection and National Security).
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removal from the United States. During Senate hearings discussing the
enactment of the deadline, Senator Alan K. Simpson of Wyoming
questioned the motivations driving asylum applications filed more than
one year after arrival. He stated that noncitizens arrested by
immigration authorities after being undocumented in the United States
for “2, 3 years and . . . say, ‘I am seeking asylum’ because they know
that these procedures are interminable.”30
In enacting the one-year deadline, Congress enumerated two
exceptions to the bar to asylum protection: where the asylum applicant
has demonstrated “to the satisfaction of the Attorney General” that (1)
changed circumstances exist which materially affect the applicant’s
eligibility for asylum, or (2) extraordinary circumstances exist and
relate to the delay in filing.31
Changed circumstances include a situation where an individual
who was previously not in danger suddenly became at risk—commonly
due to shifting dynamics in the country of origin, for example, a coup,
or the sudden or escalated targeting of a specific group of people. A
changed circumstance could also originate with the individual herself—
for example a woman who had a child out of wedlock may face harmful
repercussions at home, or someone who discovered she was HIVpositive may fear danger upon return.32
Regulations enumerate examples of extraordinary circumstances
exceptions to the one-year deadline and include: serious illness, mental
or physical disability, legal disability, death or serious illness of a legal
representative or an immediate family member, and prior possession of
legal status.33 The Asylum Division of USCIS provides additional
examples of extraordinary circumstances in its training materials for
asylum officers, including, but not limited to, “severe family or spousal

30.
142 CONG. REC. S4468 (daily ed. May 1, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Simpson). Critiques of the filing deadline and its purpose to deter fraud have included
the fact that if an individual is “sophisticated enough to concoct a fraudulent application
[they are also] more likely to be aware of the deadline and to file within the allowable
period . . . .” Philip G. Schrag et al., Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security's
Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 651, 762
n.227 (2010).
31.
INA § 208(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. §
208.4(a), (a)(5) (2016).
32.
The regulations enumerate “changed circumstances” that may excuse a
late filing for asylum, including changes in conditions in the applicant’s country or
nationality, changes in United States applicable law, changes in the applicant’s personal
circumstances, and an applicant who was previously included as a dependent on
another’s pending asylum application who lost that relationship through marriage,
divorce, or death. See DREE K. COLLOPY, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 189–90 (7th ed. 2015) (citing regulations
and case law on changed circumstances).
33.
8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5).
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opposition, extreme isolation within a refugee community, profound
language barriers, or profound difficulties in cultural acclimatization.”34
Notably, the Asylum Division goes beyond the guidance provided by
the regulations, but no such guidance is issued for immigration judges.
As discussed below, immigration judges fail to properly adjudicate even
some of the clearly enumerated extraordinary circumstances, resulting
in the denial of protection to genuine asylum seekers based on the filing
deadline.35
Although, at the time, Congress remained “committed to ensuring
that those with legitimate claims are not returned to persecution,”36
over the years, critics of the one-year deadline have argued that it
operates to do just that—return vulnerable asylum seekers in need of
protection to the harm from which they fled.37 The immediately
proceeding section examines these critiques and discusses the ways in
which the one-year filing deadline operates to bar protection for
genuine refugees. The fear that the one-year filing deadline would
return legitimate asylum seekers to persecution because of “technical
difficulties” is now playing out in new ways in light of the immigration
court backlog, as discussed below in Parts III and IV of this Article.38
First, however, it is worth focusing on the ways in which this twentyyear-old law was already harming refugees, prior to the existence of an
extreme backlog of cases in immigration court.

34.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. – RAIO – ASYLUM DIV.,
ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE: ONE-YEAR FILING DEADLINE 20 (Mar. 23,
2009),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20A
sylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/One-Year-Filing-Deadline-31aug10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5AX-4NCW].
35.
See Musalo & Rice, supra note 24, at 703–07 (explaining that adjudicators
ignore Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) avoidance symptoms and “frequently
ignore or reject evidence of . . . psychological disorders when considering exceptions
to timely filing”); Id. at 708 (explaining that applicants with seriously ill immediate
family members are denied asylum for failure to file within one year, despite the clear
regulatory exception).
36.
142 CONG. REC. S11, 840 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
37.
See infra Section I.C.
38.
142 CONG. REC. S11, 840 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (assuring the Senate that the list of exceptions to the one-year deadline was nonexhaustive, meaning that “legitimate claims of asylum [would not be] returned to
persecution, particularly for technical difficulties”). For a detailed analysis of the rate
of rejection of asylum applications based on the one-year bar, see Schrag et al., supra
note 30, at 753 (estimating that 15,792 asylum applications would have been granted in
the eleven years after the one-year bar was enacted if there was no deadline, in addition
to their family member derivatives).
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C. Operation of the One-Year Deadline to Bar Protection for Genuine
Refugees
Following the enactment of the one-year bar, a significant number
of asylum seekers missed the deadline to apply for asylum. One study
found that thirty percent of asylum applicants who filed between
September 1998 and June 2008 missed the deadline to apply.39
One particularly vulnerable group of asylum seekers—survivors of
gender-based harm, including those subjected to, or fleeing, forced
marriage, female genital cutting (FGC), rape, and domestic violence—
are frequently denied asylum based on their failure to meet the one-year
deadline.40 It is clear, however, that these survivors and asylum seekers
present legitimate asylum claims. In several cases, while immigration
judges denied asylum, based solely on the failure to meet the one-year
deadline, the very same judges also often found that these applicants
met the heightened standard41 for withholding of removal, a lesser form
of protection that has no deadline.42 A 2010 study analyzing more than
300,000 asylum cases filed with the Asylum Office between September
1998 and June 2009 revealed that women asylum seekers miss the oneyear deadline at a rate thirteen percent higher than male asylum
seekers.43 The authors hypothesize that this is because women are more
likely to be survivors of sexual violence and reluctant to disclose those
experiences to government officials and also less likely, given the
39.
Schrag et al., supra note 30, at 688.
40.
Musalo & Rice, supra note 24, at 700–02 (citing numerous examples of
survivors of gender-based harm denied asylum based on the filing deadline but granted
withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture); HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 32–33.
41.
This heightened standard requires that an individual be found “more likely
than not” to face a “threat to her life or freedom” if returned to her country of feared
persecution, rather than the asylum standard, which requires a “well-founded fear” of
persecution. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1987) (standing for
two important points: first, holding that asylum claims are not held to the “more likely
than not standard” and that “well-founded fear” is a lower threshold, and, second,
citing scholar A. Grahl Madsen for the proposition that the “well-founded fear”
standard could be as low as a one-in-ten chance of future persecution); INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984) (holding that the “clear probability of persecution” standard
applies to withholding of removal).
42.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430–31; see also HEARTLAND ALLIANCE ET
AL., THE ONE-YEAR ASYLUM DEADLINE AND THE BIA: NO PROTECTION, NO PROCESS:
AN ANALYSIS OF BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS DECISIONS 2005-2008, at 2 (2010),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/1YD-report-FULL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M8WY-8MPW] (evaluating how the BIA applies the one-year
deadline by analyzing 3,742 cases—obtained through a FOIA request—decided during
the month of January in the time range from 2005-2008, and finding that many cases
are denied based on the one-year deadline alone and meet the higher burden of proof
and standard for withholding protection).
43.
Schrag et al., supra note 30, at 652, 702.
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evolving nature of gender-based asylum, to understand that they are
eligible for asylum.44
Similarly, individuals fleeing targeted persecution on account of
their sexual orientation have been harmed by the one-year deadline.45
An individual who has fled persecution on account of social stigma
surrounding her identity in her home country is often culturally
conditioned to feel shame and embarrassment surrounding the
characteristic for which she is targeted.46 Logically, then, she may be
reticent to quickly come forward and affirmatively share her experience
with American immigration authorities.
In general, survivors of trauma and torture may also be negatively
affected by the one-year filing deadline, as certain mental health
conditions can affect an individual’s ability to timely file for asylum.47
One of the hallmark symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), for example, is avoidance. With avoidance, an individual may
find it extremely difficult to talk about, think about, or explain the
traumatic events she has endured.48 Despite this—and often despite

44.
Id. at 702–03.
45.
Victoria Neilson & Aaron Morris, The Gay Bar: The Effect of the OneYear Filing Deadline on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and HIV-Positive
Foreign Nationals Seeking Asylum or Withholding of Removal, 8 N.Y.C. L. REV. 233,
234 (2005); see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 32–33; Musalo & Rice,
supra note, 24 at 701 (discussing the case of a Russian lesbian whose asylum claim was
denied because of the deadline whose withholding removal was granted); Schrag et al.,
supra note 30, at 678–79 (sharing case of a gay Peruvian man denied asylum because of
his delay in filing his application).
46.
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 32 (discussing the risk of
further persecution when nature of mistreatment becomes public knowledge).
47.
Stuart L. Lustig, Symptoms of Trauma Among Political Asylum
Applicants: Don't Be Fooled, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 725, 731 (2008)
(explaining how the avoidance symptoms of PTSD may inhibit an asylum seeker from
timely submitting her application for asylum); see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra
note 29, at 29–32 (noting several examples of asylum seekers unable to file due to the
mental health consequences of the trauma they had endured); Michele R. Pistone,
Asylum Filing Deadlines: Unfair and Unnecessary, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 95, 98–99
(1996) (writing before the enactment of the one-year deadline and explaining that
trauma survivors need time to recover from traumatic events prior to filing an asylum
application).
48.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC (Apr.
15,
2014),
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/post-traumatic-stressdisorder/basics/symptoms/con-20022540 [https://perma.cc/9QRX-Z3VB]) (explaining
that avoidance symptoms can include “[t]rying to avoid thinking or talking about the
traumatic event; Avoiding places, activities or people that remind you of the traumatic
event”); PTSD: National Center for PTSD, U.S. DEP’T. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/PTSD-overview/basics/what-is-ptsd.asp
[https://perma.cc/S6ZU-JAB9] (last visited Aug. 26, 2016) (sharing the four types of
symptoms of PTSD, including avoidance symptoms, described as “[a]voiding situations
that remind you of the [traumatic] event. You may try to avoid situations or people that
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expert evidence and testimony—adjudicators misunderstand how these
symptoms interfere with an ability to file, conflating general
functionality in life of the applicant with her ability to undertake the
necessary steps to file for asylum and disclose details of what is often
deeply personal and deeply traumatic violence.49
Further, although status as an unaccompanied minor is specifically
enumerated as an exception to the one-year deadline,50 (exceptions are
discussed in further depth below) apparently some adjudicators have
applied the bar to deny claims by unaccompanied minors.51 This is
especially troubling as younger asylum seekers generally miss the
deadline to apply at a higher rate than older asylum seekers,52 and the
number of children seeking asylum has dramatically increased in recent
years.53
trigger memories of the traumatic event. You may even avoid talking or thinking about
the event.”).
49.
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 30 (“Even though individuals
who are suffering from PTSD or other psychological disorders should be afforded
exceptions to the filing deadline, many still find their cases denied or delayed as a result
of the filing deadline. In some cases, adjudicators point to an applicant’s ability to
perform other tasks in their lives – such as maintain a job, take care of his or her
children, or attend church – to conclude that the applicant had the capacity to file for
asylum. This analysis reflects a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of
trauma and PTSD.”); Khandwala et al., supra note 29, at 8 (explaining how
immigration judges routinely find asylum to be barred for individuals living with PTSD
who miss the deadline); see also Musalo & Rice, supra note 24, at 703 (“An IJ who
accepts that an applicant is suffering from a psychological disorder, but rejects the
causal connection between the disorder and the delay in filing fails to recognize the
phenomenon of avoidance symptoms. Some adjudicators conclude that if PTSD did not
prevent an applicant from worshiping, giving birth, marrying, working, or studying in
her first year after arrival, then it cannot have delayed the application for asylum.”).
50.
8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii) (2016) (“Legal disability (e.g., the applicant
was an unaccompanied minor or suffered from a mental impairment) during the 1-year
period after arrival”) (emphasis added).
51.
Musalo & Rice, supra note 24, at 707–08 (reporting that “adjudicators
apply the one-year bar to preclude claims presented by unaccompanied minors” and
discussing the BIA decision, In re Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 286 (B.I.A. 2002), which
refused to create a per se exception for minors and interpreting the regulations to
provide only a “possible” extraordinary circumstance for minors).
52.
Schrag et al., supra note 30, at 706 (reporting that thirty-two percent of
applications filed by zero-to-seventeen year olds were untimely filed and thirty-four
percent of applications filed by eighteen-to-twenty-nine year olds were also untimely
filed, in contrast to lower percentages for the older asylum seekers).
53.
See ELIZABETH KENNEDY, NO CHILDHOOD HERE: WHY CENTRAL
AMERICAN
CHILDREN
ARE
FLEEING
THEIR
HOMES
(July
2014),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/no-childhood-here-why-centralamerican-children-are-fleeing-their-homes [https://perma.cc/CMH9-44H9]; UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CHILDREN ON THE RUN: UNACCOMPANIED
CHILDREN LEAVING CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO AND THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/aboutus/background/56fc266f4/children-on-the-run-full-
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Some asylum seekers simply do not know about the process for
applying for asylum: language barriers, isolation, and other factors can
make it difficult for them to discover their responsibility to file within
one year of arrival in the United States.54 American immigration
authorities make no affirmative efforts to advise or inform asylum
seekers of the one-year deadline, even in instances where it is
abundantly clear that the individual intends to apply for asylum, such as
passing a credible fear interview.55 Despite the lack of notice and lack
of general awareness among asylum seekers regarding the existence of
the one-year deadline, courts have repeatedly found that “ignorance of
the law is no excuse” for failing to comply with the one-year deadline.56
Other asylum seekers do timely submit their applications for asylum but
fail to meet their legal burden of proof to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that they had timely filed.57 Even in cases where
the adjudicator finds the asylum seeker credible and to otherwise meet
the standard for asylum, relief is denied.58
Finally, scholars have argued that the one-year deadline results in
violations of the United States’ international legal obligations under the
1967 Protocol to the Convention on the Status of Refugees.59 The

report.html?query=children%20on%20the%20run
[https://perma.cc/BXG6-PHRV];
see generally Lauren A. Aronson, The Tipping Point: The Failure of Form Over
Substance in Addressing the Needs of Unaccompanied Immigrant Children, 18 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 1 (2015).
54.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 35–36.
55.
See Mendez Rojas v. Johnson, No. 2:16-cv-01024-RSM (W.D. Wash.
filed June 30, 2016) (claiming that this lack of notice of the one-year deadline to asylum
seekers violates not only the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also basic notions of
due process and fairness under the Fifth Amendment).
56.
Tian v. Holder, 745 F.3d 822, 824–26 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding no
jurisdiction to review immigration judge and BIA determination that ignorance of the
law does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance exception for missing the oneyear deadline); Uluiviti v. Holder, 509 F. App’x 629 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing AntonioMartinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating the general proposition
that ignorance of the law is no excuse)); Diego-Pedtro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 324 F.
App’x 791, 792–93 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that ignorance of the law not to be an
excuse for untimely filing and the court lacked jurisdiction to review this finding);
Rashad v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1, 2–3 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that ignorance of the law
no excuse for untimely filing and the court lacked jurisdiction to review this finding);
Rusu v. Mukasey, 298 F. App’x 588, 589 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Antonio-Martinez, 317
F.3d at 1093); Mlambo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 297 F. App’x 198, 200 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008)
(immigration judge noting that ignorance of the law is no excuse to untimely filing and
the BIA and court agreed).
57.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 11.
58.
Id.
59.
Musalo & Rice, supra note 24, at 722 (“The one-year bar has no impact
on fraudulent claims. It does, however, cause the refoulement of legitimate refugees, in
violation of international obligations.”) (emphasis omitted); Nielsen & Morris, supra
note 45, at 278 (“Worse yet, those saddled with withholding are the ‘lucky’ ones.
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United Nations High Commission for Refugees has similarly expressed
concern that the one-year deadline violates the United States’
international refugee law obligations.60
Since its inception, scholars and immigrant advocates have
critiqued the one-year bar for its failure to protect the groups discussed
above as well as the way in which it undermines efficient adjudication
of asylum claims.61 The interplay between the immigration court
backlog, then, is just the latest iteration of how the filing deadline
undermines the ability of asylum seekers to access protection in the
United States.
D. Why Withholding of Removal and Relief Under the Convention
Against Torture are Inadequate
Where an asylum seeker is barred from asylum by her failure to
meet the filing deadline, an immigration judge considers her eligibility
There may be many thousands of deserving foreign nationals who were returned to the
countries from which they fled even though they could have established a ‘well-founded
fear’ of future persecution, but who were unable to meet the heightened ‘more likely
than not’ probability of future persecution which is required for a grant of
withholding.”); Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee
Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37
STAN. J. INT'L L. 117, 141–42 (2001) (“While the INS is making efforts to minimize
the impacts of the one-year deadline, the existence of such a strict time limit violates
the duty of non-refoulement. . . . The deadline means that refugees are at risk of being
returned to the country in which they fear persecution simply because they were unable
to fulfill a formal, mechanistic requirement.”) (emphasis omitted); Misha Seay, Better
Late Than Never: A Critique of the United States’ Asylum Filing Deadline from
International and Comparative Law Perspectives, 34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
407, 426–27 (2011) (arguing that because genuine refugees may miss the one-year
deadline, yet be unable to meet the higher standard for withholding of removal, they
may be refouled in violation of United States treaty obligations under the Convention
against Torture and the Protocol).
60.
At a March 2010 event marking the 30th anniversary of the United States’
Refugee Act of 1980, António Guterres, current UN Secretary General and then-United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, described the one-year deadline as
“diverg[ing] from international standards” and that it makes it “more difficult for many
asylum seekers to establish their need for protection.” António Guterres, United
Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Closing Keynote at Georgetown Law School
Conference: 30th Anniversary of the Refugee Act of 1980 (Mar. 16, 2010); see also
United Nations Gen. Assembly, Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’rs Programme, Note
on International Protection, A/AC.96/898 (July 3, 1998) (noting that the “imposition of
unreasonable time limits for the filing of asylum requests” could lead to refoulement of
refugees).
61.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 2 (explaining that the one-year
deadline delays the adjudication of cases referred to immigration court by the asylum
office based on the deadline, as well as diverting time and resources by all adjudicators
to “litigating a technicality, when those resources could instead be allocated to
evaluating the actual merits of asylum cases, or could simply be saved or re-allocated to
other matters”).
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for withholding of removal (“withholding”) or relief under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT).62 No filing deadline exists for
either of those forms of protection.63 The legal elements to establish a
claim for asylum and withholding of removal are the same—the asylum
seeker must meet the legal definition of a refugee.64 But, withholding
grantees must meet a heightened burden of proof, in terms of the
likelihood of the future harm occurring, to be granted withholding.65
While an asylum seeker must show that she has a well-founded fear of
persecution, which has been construed as low as a one-in-ten chance of
future harm,66 to be granted withholding the applicant must prove that it
is “more likely than not,” of more than fifty percent likely, that she
will face a threat to her life or freedom.67 Thus, an individual asylum
seeker may be able to prove their burden of a ten percent chance of
harm, but if she failed to file her application within one year, she may
struggle to prove that it is fifty-one percent (or more) likely that she
will be harmed in order to meet the heightened standard for withholding
protection.68 Similarly, to be granted protection under CAT, the
applicant must show that it is more likely than not, more than fifty-one
percent likely, that she will be tortured if returned to her home
country.69
Despite the higher burden of proof for withholding protection, it is
indisputably a lesser form of relief. The ways in which withholding and
CAT relief are inferior forms of relief to asylum are discussed below,
but where an individual is barred from asylum by the one-year
deadline, this is the only relief available.
First, an asylum seeker is able to adjust status after one year of
physical presence in the United States and become a lawful permanent
resident,70 and eventually a citizen. The same is not true for individuals

62.
8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (b)(1), (b)(3) (2016).
63.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 7.
64.
See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A)–(B) (2012).
65.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 9.
66.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
67.
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984).
68.
This problem may be ameliorated by a regulatory presumption that those
demonstrating “past persecution” meet the higher standard for withholding of removal.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i) (2016). Not all asylum seekers who have a well-founded
fear of future persecution will be able, however, to establish that they have suffered
past persecution in order to benefit from this presumption for both asylum and
withholding relief.
69.
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(2), 1208.16(c)(2) (2016). Unlike withholding of
removal under the INA, there is no regulatory presumption of future torture arising
from proof of past torture, although past torture is a factor that should be considered in
establishing the probability of future torture. See Id. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i).
70.
See INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(2) (2012).
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granted withholding or CAT.71 CAT grantees receive an order
prohibiting their return to the country where they fear torture, but says
they could be transported elsewhere.72 These individuals, often
survivors of torture and trauma, are left in limbo, constantly in fear of
being returned to their home country or to another country (if the
United States government can secure this transfer). Further,
withholding grantees receive a removal order and, usually, must check
in periodically with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
officials—which require lengthy waits in ICE offices on a weekly,
monthly, or somewhat less frequent basis.73 Finally, while withholding
grantees are eligible for work authorization, their work permit is valid
for just one year and they must apply each year to renew their
authorization for employment.74
Second, an asylee may file a petition for her spouse and unmarried
children under the age of twenty-one at the time she files for asylum.75
While this process of family reunification is often delayed and
lengthy,76 eventually, the family may be reunited. A failure to reunite
family members who remain overseas, often in danger, has been shown
to have detrimental mental health effects for the asylee.77 In contrast,
withholding recipients do not have the right to petition to reunite with
their family members overseas.
Third, an asylee may apply for a refugee travel document and
receive permission to travel outside the United States.78 A withholding
recipient, however, is unable to travel, at least if she intends to return
to the United States,79 which undermines not only familial relationships

71.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 9.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 20.
74.
An initial employment authorization card granted to an asylee, in contrast,
is valid for two years. It may be renewed annually but asylees may also adjust
status to permanent residents after one year, after which time a work permit is no
longer necessary. Asylees also are not technically required to have a work permit
in order to work, see OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR IMMIGRATION-RELATED
UNFAIR EMP’T PRACTICES, REFUGEES AND ASYLUMS HAVE THE RIGHT TO WORK,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/osc/pdf/refugee_asyleeflyer32510.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7WY5-T84G] (last visited Aug. 26, 2016), but many choose to
do so as a form of identification and because many employers expect
documentation of this nature.
75.
See INA § 208(b)(3)(A)–(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A)–(B) (2012).
76.
See Lindsay M. Harris, From Surviving to Thriving? An Investigation of
Asylee Integration in the United States, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 29, 46,
55, 119 (2016) (providing a comprehensive guide to the benefits and services to which
asylees are entitled).
77.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 20–23.
78.
8 C.F.R. §§ 223.1, 223.2(a) (2016).
79.
Neilson & Morris, supra note 45, at 247.

2016:1185 One-Year Bar to Asylum in the Age of Backlog

1203

with those outside the country, but also potentially employment
opportunities for individuals who may possess desirable language
skills.80
Fourth, asylees are eligible for various benefits and services
offered through the Office of Refugee Resettlement.81 In contrast,
withholding and CAT recipients are eligible for a more limited set of
benefits and services.82
These differences are stark. The one-year filing deadline draws a
harsh line between the individuals who meet that deadline and those
who do not. All applicants for asylum also automatically apply for
withholding relief and relief under CAT.83 If an asylum seeker misses
the one-year deadline, she will only be considered for the latter two
forms of relief.84 Unless an asylum seeker who misses the deadline can
convince a judge that she meets an exception, she will be denied
asylum.85 Next, unless that asylum seeker convinces the judge that she
meets the higher burden for protection in the form of withholding or
CAT relief, she will be deported to a place where she faces anywhere
from a ten-to-fifty percent chance of persecution.86 Even if she can
convince the judge that she meets the higher standard, if granted
withholding or CAT protection, she will: (1) never become a
permanent resident or citizen; (2) live in fear of deportation should the
United States decide to remove her to a third country; (3) likely never
see her overseas children or spouse again; (4) generally not receive any
services or benefits to assist in her integration to the United States,
even if she is destitute and living far below the poverty line; and (5)
never be able to travel outside the United States for personal, family, or
employment purposes.87 Individuals granted withholding or CAT relief
are living in a legal purgatory—unable to truly integrate and become
members of our society, despite their living, working, and raising

80.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 21 (recounting the case of an
Egyptian asylum seeker granted withholding protection unable to accept a job overseas
as an Arabic interpreter with the United States military in Iraq).
81.
Harris, supra note 76, at 40–42, 44–47, 119–24 (Appendix B details the
benefits and services for which asylees may be eligible).
82.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 20–22 (explaining that
withholding recipients are at risk of deportation, are separated from their families,
cannot apply for permanent resident states, have difficulties obtaining an education, and
difficulty obtaining employment).
83.
8 C.F.R. § 208.3(a), (b) (2016).
84.
Id. § 208.4(a)(2)(A).
85.
Id. § 208.4(a)(5).
86.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 9; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 431, 440 (1987).
87.
Neilson & Morris, supra note 45, at 246–48, 250–51; HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST, supra note 29, at 9, 20–22.
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families in the United States.88 Unfortunately, despite the recent policy
change announced by EOIR, pro se asylum seekers remain especially at
risk of missing the one-year deadline.89 These unrepresented individuals
may not be granted the protection they deserve due to the effects of the
immigration court backlog, a lack of notice of the one-year deadline,
and a shortage of competent, affordable or pro bono, legal
representation, discussed below.
II. IMMIGRATION COURT BACKLOG & A CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION
A. The Extreme Immigration Court Backlog
The EOIR currently has fifty-seven immigration courts and
approximately 291 immigration judges.90 For years, researchers have
warned of a coming crisis and of the difficult professional atmosphere
in which immigration judges must work, with inadequate support staff
and overwhelming dockets, which are generally beyond the control of
local judges.91 Under these sparse conditions, immigration judges
adjudicate, as immigration judge Dana Leigh Marks has famously
explained, “death penalty cases” in “traffic court.”92

88.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 2 (reporting that the depriving
refugees of the ability to become permanent residents and United States citizens
“[u]ndercut[s] governmental interests in integration” and also makes it “more difficult
for them to access jobs and education”); see also Nielsen & Morris, supra note 45, at
278, 280 (“[T]he implementation of the one-year deadline has created a new, and
perhaps unexpected, class of individuals who are forever trapped in the United States in
the limbo status of withholding of removal. . . . The failure to comply with a
procedural deadline is no justification for holding human lives in a permanent state of
limbo—a state of limbo which is produced by prohibiting those with withholding status
from ever traveling outside the United States or petitioning for relatives to join them
here. These prohibitions leave those granted withholding unable to ever fully become a
part of American society.”).
89.
Memorandum from Michael C. McGoings, supra note 7.
90.
See Press Release, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, supra note 2.
91.
Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses
from the National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57 (2008); BETSY CAVENDISH & STEVEN SCHULMAN, REIMAGINING
THE IMMIGRATION COURT ASSEMBLY LINE: TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE FOR THE
IMMIGRATION JUSTICE SYSTEM (2012), http://www.appleseednetwork.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/Reimagining-the-Immigration-Court-Assembly-Line.pdf
[https://perma.cc/53DE-P977].
92.
Executive Office for Immigration Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law of the Comm. on the
Judiciary H.R., 111th Cong. 55 (2010) (written statement of Hon. Dana Leigh Marks,
President, National Association of Immigration Judges) (“Currently, complex and highstakes matters, such as asylum cases that can be tantamount to death penalty cases, are
being adjudicated in a setting that most closely resembles traffi§c court.”).

2016:1185 One-Year Bar to Asylum in the Age of Backlog

1205

In recent years, increasing caseloads have begun to overwhelm
courts and judges. The backlog of cases yet to be heard across the
nation is currently over 521,000.93 This backlog results in a dramatic
wait time, simply for the first scheduling hearing before an immigration
judge—known as the master calendar hearing—of an average of 675
days, or close to two years.94 At the master calendar hearing, the
immigration judge issues certain advisals, counsel may enter an
appearance, pleadings may be taken, and a merits or “individual”
hearing will be scheduled.95 Applications for relief from removal may
be filed at the initial or a subsequent master calendar hearing.96 It is not
until the individual merits hearing that an asylum seeker’s application
for asylum will be adjudicated—following the presentation of evidence,
testimony, and witnesses.97 Only after this individual hearing, which
may be scheduled anywhere from two-to-six years into the future, can
an immigration judge render a decision on the merits of the asylum
claim.98 Experts estimate that if current staffing levels of judges and
administrators at immigration courts persist, the backlog will reach one
million by 2022.99
The immigration court backlog undoubtedly poses problems and
challenges for many immigrants,100 who endure years of uncertainty,
93.
See Caldwell, supra note 2; see also Backlog of Pending Cases in
Immigration Court as of September 2016, supra note 2.
94.
Average Time Pending Cases Have Been Waiting in Immigration
Courts
as
of
May
2016,
TRAC
IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog_avgdays.php
[https://perma.cc/7VHD-P3E5] (reflecting an average of 675 days for adjudication of
immigration court cases nationwide). It is important to note that the TRAC numbers
only reflect the average time that individuals have already been waiting for adjudication
of their claims and not the total time that they will in fact wait for adjudication. In
September 2015, TRAC estimated that actual full adjudication of cases in the backlog
would take between 659 and 2,401 days. See Ballooning Wait Times for Hearing Dates
in Overworked Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Sept. 21, 2016),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/405/ [https://perma.cc/A2SE-U7FA].
95.
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.15 (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
2016).
96.
Id. § 4.15(i)(i).
97.
See generally id. § 4.16.
98.
An immigration judge may render an oral or written decision after an
individual merits hearing. Id. § 4.16(g).
99.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN THE BALANCE: BACKLOGS DELAY PROTECTION IN
THE
U.S. ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION COURT SYSTEMS
ii
(2016),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-In-The-Balance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PCE-KE49] (estimating that the case backlog would reach over
500,000 by the end of Fiscal Year 2016 and one-million by 2022).
100. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 99 (discussing mental
health issues posed by the delay in adjudication, along with problems with integration
into the workforce and the harmful effects of prolonged separation from family
members, many of whom are living overseas in danger); see also Empty Benches:
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waiting for their day in court, and for justice to be administered in their
cases. As Human Rights First has reported, the backlog results in
delays approaching five years in some parts of the country:
As a result of the ballooning backlogs at the immigration
courts, hundreds of thousands of immigrants are in a state of
legal limbo for more than three years on average. The most
delayed courts have wait times of four to five years. For
example, it will take the Newark court more than five years to
hear currently pending cases. In Texas, immigrants and asylum
seekers must now wait on average over 1,700 days—nearly five
years—for their cases to be resolved. In Maryland they wait
nearly two years, in Georgia and Alabama three and a half
years, in Arizona more than three years, and in California
nearly three years. Since 2014 alone, wait times have grown by
34 percent in Houston, 28 percent in Dallas, 20 percent in
Newark, and 15 percent in Baltimore. Immigrants in New York
can expect to wait at least two and a half years for the court to
consider their case.101
These backlogs have an especially deleterious effect on asylum
seekers, however, due to the dysfunctional mechanics of the one-year
deadline.102 By regulation, an asylum application is “filed” for the
purposes of meeting the one-year filing deadline if it is “received by”
an immigration court or the Board of Immigration Appeals.103
Similarly, nothing in the Immigration and Nationality Act specifies how
an asylum application should be filed.104 It appears then, according to
the statute and the regulations, that all an asylum applicant must do to
file her application is to ensure that the immigration court physically
receives her application before the deadline.

Underfunding
of
Immigration
Courts
Undermines
Justice,
AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL
(June
17,
2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/empty_benche
s_underfunding_of_immigration_courts_undermines_justice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5EQ7-YURW] (explaining that long delays caused those eventually
granted relief to suffer, cause family separation, undermine ability to work and
contribute financially, along with prolonged detention of individuals).
101. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 99, at 6.
102. Other adverse ramifications of the immigration court and affirmative
asylum backlog on asylum seekers include prolonged family separation, potentially
leaving children and spouses in danger overseas, deleterious mental health effects,
delays to integration through education and employment, and undermining of pro bono
representation. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 99, at iii.
103. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2016).
104. See generally INA §§ 101–507, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–537 (2012).
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Yet until very recently, this straightforward procedure—simply
filing an application with the court—was not accepted according to
agency practice.105 A memo from the Chief Immigration Judge in
March 2000 made it clear that defensive asylum applications should be
filed in open court.106 The open-court filing requirement was later
adopted by EOIR’s immigration court practice manual, first issued in
2008, which made clear that asylum applications are filed in open court
at a master calendar hearing presided over by an immigration judge.107
EOIR never explained the rationale behind the in-court filing
requirement,108 but on September 14, 2016, announced a policy change
to permit asylum applications to be filed, for one-year bar purposes, at
the court window, rather than in open court.109 This step forward is
important because master calendar hearings, at which an individual
could file their asylum application, are frequently scheduled beyond one
year after an individual asylum seeker’s entry into the United States.110

105. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(B)(ii).
106. MICHAEL J. CREPPY, CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, OPERATING PROCEDURES
AND POLICY MEMORANDUM 00-01, ASYLUM REQUEST PROCESSING (Aug. 4, 2000)
(“Local Court rules notwithstanding, including any such rules related to the filing of
Motions for a Change of Venue, defensive asylum applications can only be filed with
the Immigration Court at a Master Calendar or a Master Calendar Reset Hearing. This
is true even where the defensive asylum application is filed in conjunction with other
applications for relief. However, the Chief Immigration Judge may, from time to time
as circumstances require, expressly permit an exception to this general rule”) (emphasis
changed from underlining to italics.).
107. IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 3.1(b)(iii) (U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE 2016) (“A defensive asylum applications are filed in open court at a master
calendar hearing.”). It is worth noting that other sections of the practice manual use
language such as “should” or “must” and so potentially there is an argument that the
softer language of this provision always enabled judges to accept asylum applications
lodged at the court window as “filed.” The concept of lodging versus filing is discussed
below in subsection II.B., infra note 128.
108. A closer examination of the statute may shed light on the reason for the
apparent open-court filing requirement, which EOIR never explained. INA § 208(c)(4)
states that “at the time of filing an application for asylum,” the immigration judge
(through power delegated from the Attorney General) shall advise the applicant of the
privilege of representation along with the warning regarding making a frivolous
application for asylum. INA § 208(c)(6), 8 U.S.C § 1158(d)(4) (2012) states that “if the
Attorney General determines that an alien has knowingly made a frivolous application
for asylum and the alien has received the notice under paragraph 4(A), the alien shall
be permanently ineligible for any benefits under this Act . . . .” Perhaps, then, the
rationale for filing an asylum application in court was to enable a judge to render the
oral advisals regarding filing a frivolous asylum application.
109. IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 3.1(a)(v).
110. Motion for Class Certification at 5, Mendez Rojas v. Johnson, No. 2:16cv-01024-RSM (W.D. Wash. filed July 21, 2016) (explaining that many master
calendar hearings are not scheduled until after the one-year deadline). Indeed, the
master calendars are not scheduled just days, weeks, or months beyond the deadline. In
working with the CARA Project and attorneys across the nation while at the American
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Thus, through no action or fault of her own—and only because of the
tremendous backlog of removal cases and administrative scheduling of
the court—prior to the September 14, 2016 policy change, an asylum
seeker often completely lacked an opportunity to timely file her
application in open court as directed by the immigration court practice
manual.111
The recently announced policy change, explored in more detail in
Part III below, does not entirely remedy the situation for all asylum
seekers, and, in fact, creates a worse situation for pro se asylum
seekers, as discussed in the next section.
B. A Crisis in Legal Representation of Asylum Seekers
Immigrants do not have a right to a government-appointed attorney
in immigration proceedings, although they may hire one at their own
expense or through pro bono services.112 Most immigrants, including
the majority of asylum seekers, lack legal representation.113 Indeed, a
national study of immigration cases from 2007-2012 found that only
thirty-seven percent of all immigrants and only fourteen percent of
detained immigrants secured legal representation in removal
proceedings.114 That study also found that law school clinics, nonprofits, and pro bono law firm representation only account for two
percent of that representation in removal proceedings.115
Of cases involving adults with children decided between July 2014
and September 2016, seventy percent of the families were
Immigration Council, exploring this issues in 2015-2016, the Author routinely heard of
individuals being set for their first master calendar hearing in late 2019, three or four
years after their last arrival into the United States.
111. Aside from the simple fact of the immigration court backlog itself, causing
many master calendar hearings to be scheduled beyond the one-year deadline for a
particular asylum applicant, there are other delays in the system. As the Mendez Rojas
complaint explains, “[f]irst, DHS agents often issue a charging document . . . and serve
it on the individual, but delay filing it with the immigration court—sometimes for
months or even a year or longer.” Complaint at 3, Mendez Rojas v. Johnson, No. 2:16cv-01024-RSM (W.D. Wash. filed June 30, 2016).
112. See INA § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (stating that
the “alien shall have the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the
Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in such
proceedings”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16(b) (2016). The United States has a long history of
denying Sixth Amendment rights to immigrants in removal proceedings. See Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (holding that three Chinese residents facing
deportation were not entitled to criminal constitutional protections because they were
being subjected to civil deportation proceedings).
113. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel
in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 27.
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unrepresented.116 Of the unrepresented families, only one-in-fifteen
managed to file an application for asylum pro se and forty-three percent
were ordered deported at their initial master calendar hearing.117 The
Obama Administration placed these women and children on a special
priority docket,118 created in response to the humanitarian crisis and
increasing numbers of individuals from Central America seeking
protection in the United States, and can largely be presumed to be
asylum seekers.
Many asylum seekers exhaust their financial resources in fleeing to
the United States and, upon arrival, are unable to legally work until 180
days after their asylum application has been filed.119 Unfortunately,
immigration law is one of the most complex areas of law and has been
compared to the tax code in its labyrinthine nature.120 Navigating the
procedural requirements, let alone the complex substantive law alone,
is daunting to say the least. Indeed, a recent study on the effectiveness
of legal representation found that lawyers may have the greatest impact
where they help individuals navigate procedures that may be simple for
attorneys, but are complex for pro se individuals.121

116. With the Immigration Court’s Rocket Docket Many Unrepresented
Families Quickly Ordered Deported, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Oct. 18, 2016),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/441/ [https://perma.cc/A3MZ-NUDC] (27,015
out of the 38,601 adult with children closed cases did not have legal representation,
while legal representation was secured in only thirty percent, 11,586 cases).
117. Id.
118. In response to the President’s efforts to expeditiously react to the
humanitarian crisis (see Letter from the President--Efforts to Address the Humanitarian
Situation in the Rio Grande Valley Area of Our Nation’s Southwest Border,
WHITE
HOUSE
(June
30,
2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/06/30/letter-president-efforts-address-humanitarian-situation-rio-grandevalle [https://perma.cc/8FFH-HKUC]), the Chief Immigration Judge set up priority
dockets for unaccompanied children and for children detained with their parents (known
as the “AWC”—Adults With Children—docket). See Memorandum from Judge Brian
M. O’Leary, Chief Immigration, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Docketing Practices Related
to Unaccompanied Children in Light of the New Priorities, to all
Immigration
Judges
(Sept.
10,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/09/30/Docketing-PracticesRelated-to-UACs-Sept2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SZ7-Z8WJ].
119. For a detailed discussion of the delayed right to work for asylum seekers,
see Lori A. Nessel, Deliberate Destitution as Deterrent: Withholding the Right to Work
and Undermining Asylum Protection, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 313, 316 (2015).
120. Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) (“With only a
small degree of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed second only to the
Internal Revenue Code in [its] complexity. A lawyer is often the only person who could
thread the labyrinth,” quoting Castro-O’Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigration &
Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987)).
121. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise:
Understanding Relational and Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM.
SOC. REV. 909, 924 (2015).
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Representation is particularly limited outside of major metropolitan
areas and for detained individuals.122 Professor Michele Pistone’s rather
prescient article, written twenty years ago—prior to the enactment of
the one-year deadline—outlined the advocacy community’s fears at that
time about a lack of pro bono representation and the time it takes for an
asylum seeker to secure affordable or pro bono representation.123
Why does legal representation matter so much? Not only do
qualified and competent attorneys help to raise awareness of and avoid
complications caused by the one-year deadline, but also their overall
effect on the outcome of the case is positive for immigrants.124
122. LORI A. NESSEL & FARRIN ANELLO, DEPORTATION WITHOUT
REPRESENTATION: THE ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE CRISIS FACING NEW JERSEY’S IMMIGRANT
FAMILIES 2–3 (2016) (finding that two-thirds of detained immigrants in New Jersey
never had any representation throughout their removal proceedings and “New Jersey
lacks sufficient capacity to meet the legal services needs of adults, children, and
families in removal proceedings”); Eagly & Shafer, supra note 113, at 41 (“Immigrants
detained in small cities had the lowest representation rate—only 10% across all cities of
fewer than 50,000 residents.”); Jayashri Srikantiah et al., Access to Justice for
Immigrant Families and Communities: A Study of Legal Representation of Detained
Immigrants in Northern California, 11 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 207, 220,
222 (2015) (finding that only one-third of detained immigrants were represented in
removal proceedings in Northern California between March 1, 2013 and February 28,
2014); Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing
Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 363 (2011) (reporting that in New York City, sixty percent of
detained immigrants do not have counsel by the time their cases are completed); see
generally Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens:
Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647 (1997). The number of
detained asylum seekers has also increased in recent years. See OLGA BRYNE ET AL.,
LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN: INCREASED U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 2 (2016),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/lifeline-lockdown-increased-us-detentionasylum-seekers [https://perma.cc/Q2ML-MWHF] (“The number of asylum seekers sent
to and held in immigration detention has increased nearly threefold from 2010 to 2014.
In FY 2010, 15,683 asylum seekers—or 45 percent of all asylum seekers in removal
proceedings—were detained. In FY 2014, that number jumped to 44,228—77 percent of
all asylum seekers in court proceedings.”).
123. Michele R. Pistone, Asylum Filing Deadlines: Unfair and Unnecessary, 10
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 95, 100–01 (1996); see also Schrag et al., supra note 30, at 757
(“[R]esearch has demonstrated that asylum seekers face a multitude of barriers to
securing representation.”).
124. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM:
SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS
AND
JUDGES
7
(2008),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ESH8-BAKH] (“Representation generally doubled the likelihood that
immigration judges would grant asylum to affirmative and defensive asylum applicants
compared to those without representation, after statistical controls were applied.”);
NESSEL & ANELLO, supra note 122, at 15 (finding that only fourteen percent of pro se
immigrants secured a successful outcome in their removal proceedings versus forty-nine
percent with representation by an attorney); RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., infra note 235, at
45 (Figure 3-11 illustrating the relationship between representation and grant rates in
immigration court: sixteen percent of unrepresented individuals are granted asylum
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Prior to EOIR’s September 14, 2016 policy change—allowing
asylum applications to be filed at the court window, rather than solely
in open court125—diligent and creative advocates executed a range of
legal strategies in attempts to preserve asylum eligibility.126 In many
cases, attorneys successfully preserved the one-year filing deadline by
establishing an extraordinary circumstances exception (examples
discussed below). Those prior practices included:
(1) filing a motion to advance the hearing date;127
versus a grant rate of nearly forty-six percent for those with representation); ANDREW I.
SCHOENHOLTZ ET AL., LIVES IN THE BALANCE: ASYLUM ADJUDICATION BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 133–42 (2014) (between October 1995 and June
2009, DHS granted asylum nineteen percent more often to represented asylum seekers
than to pro se applicants); Eagly & Shafer, supra note 113, at 2 (“Moreover, we find
that immigrants with attorneys fared far better: among similarly situated removal
respondents, the odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants with representation, as
compared to those without, sought relief, and five-and-a-half times greater that they
obtained relief from removal.”); Benson & Wheeler, supra note 6, at 56 (ninety-two
percent of immigration judges who responded to a survey question agreed with the
following statement: “When the Respondent has a competent lawyer, I can conduct the
adjudication more efficiently and quickly”).
125. IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 3.1(a)(v) (U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE 2016).
126. These strategies are largely drawn from the practice advisory issued by
the American Immigration Council in January 2016. While a Legal Fellow at the
American Immigration Council, I co-authored the practice advisory, which
recommends that practitioners adopt this four-pronged approach to demonstrate good
faith efforts to file the asylum application in advance of one year in the absence of a
court date. See SANDRA A. GROSSMAN & LINDSAY M. HARRIS, PRESERVING THE ONEYEAR FILING DEADLINE FOR CASES STUCK IN THE IMMIGRATION COURT
PRACTICE
ADVISORY
6–8,
11
(2015),
BACKLOG,
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/preser
ving_the_one-year_filing_deadline_for_asylum_cases_stuck_in_the_immigration_
court_backlog_practice_advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JSH-4PFL].
127. Id. at 6–8. Although the immigration court practice manual makes clear
that a motion to advance is “disfavored,” the manual also gives an example of where a
hearing date may be advanced: “imminent ineligibility for relief, such as a minor alien
‘aging out’ of derivative status.” IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 5.10(b). In
the case where the deadline is approaching and the master calendar date—which would
allow the individual to comply with the practice manual and file in open court—is
scheduled beyond the deadline, the attorney could argue that their client, like an aging
out derivative child, will face “imminent ineligibility” for relief if a master calendar
hearing was not advanced to permit filing of the asylum application. While this seems
simple enough, in operation filing the motion was often difficult because Notices to
Appear (NTA) will often simply state that a date, time, and judge for the first master
calendar hearing is “TBD”—to be decided, as was the case with Liana’s NTA,
discussed below.
In common immigration court practice, a motion should be directed to a
particular judge and some courts do not know what to do with motions filed generally
with the court. When a motion to advance was filed, it typically made a simple request
that the judge advance the hearing date to permit timely filing of the I-589 application.
GROSSMAN & HARRIS, supra note 126, at 8. The responses to these motions were
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(2) “lodging” the application with the immigration court;128
(3) filing the application with the asylum office;129 and
mixed—some judges granted them, rescheduling the master calendar hearing and
enabling timely filing. But, no statutory, regulatory, or other guidance exists requiring
immigration judges to adjudicate motions on any specific timeline. So, other judges
failed to review or respond to the motion before the deadline, while others denied the
motions—sometimes making clear, orally or in writing, that they intended to construe
the delay as an extraordinary circumstance or will accept “lodging” as filing, and at
other times simply denying the motion with no indication of their intended decision on
the issue of the deadline. This left attorneys and asylum seekers in limbo, and, in some
cases, without a remedy for missing the deadline.
128. GROSSMAN & HARRIS, supra note 126, at 6–7. Memorandum from Judge
Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigration, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Operating Policies
and Procedures, to all Immigration Judges, Attachment B (Dec. 2, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/12/03/13-03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BFN7-ZWHC]. “Lodging” refers to the practice of submitting the
application at the filing window at an individual immigration court, rather than
attempting to file in open court. IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 3.1(a)(v).
This permits the start of the “clock” for asylum seekers for work authorization
purposes. Memorandum from Judge Brian M. O’Leary, supra at Attachment B.
Essentially, asylum seekers are permitted to apply for an employment authorization
document 150 days after they have filed an application for asylum. Id. When USCIS
and EOIR were sued in late 2011 over the broken system of administering the “asylum
clock,” they agreed, by settlement to permit “lodging” of an asylum application at the
court window, by mail or by hand, which would start the days counting on the asylum
“clock” for purposes of obtaining an employment authorization document, or, a work
permit. Settlement Agreement at 2, 16, B.H. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.,
No.
CV11-2108-RAJ
(W.D.
Wash.
Nov.
4,
2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/09/27/ABT_Settlement_Ag
reement_Redlined_092713.pdf [https://perma.cc/76QF-XJKD].
Within that settlement, the government made it very clear that lodging would not
be automatically considered filing for the purposes of meeting the one-year deadline for
asylum, but that individual judges could “consider the legal effect of an asylum
application when considering whether an exception to the one-year bar applies.”
Memorandum from Judge Brian M. O’Leary, supra at 6.
EOIR never made clear the rationale behind their unwillingness to construe
lodging as filing for one-year deadline purposes, but, in meetings in which the author
has been present, EOIR officials have emphasized a need to defer to the discretion of
individual immigration judges to adjudicate these issues on a case-by-case basis. Thus,
lodging simply meant that a court clerk or administrator will stamp an I-589 as “lodged
but not filed” to permit the start of the clock for work employment purposes. Id. at
Attachment B. Some judges, however, construed lodging as filing for asylum purposes
and some courts even went so far as to make it clear in pro bono liaison meetings with
area practitioners that the court-wide policy was to accept lodging as filing. GROSSMAN
& HARRIS, supra note 126, at 7 n.38 (the judges at the immigration court in Arlington,
Virginia, for example, have made such an announcement to local practitioners).
This clearly simplified the process and provided an easy way for the troublesome
interplay between the deadline and the backlog to be remedied, but it only really
provided this remedy for represented individuals. For pro se asylum seekers, it is
unlikely that they would understand the nuances of lodging versus filing.
129. GROSSMAN & HARRIS, supra note 126, at 6. Attorneys with clients in
removal proceedings without a timely court date also attempted to file applications
affirmatively with USCIS with mixed results. Sometimes USCIS rejected the I-589
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(4) advancing arguments that undergoing a credible fear interview
constitutes the filing of an asylum application.130
These practices, by and large, are no longer necessary given the
recent policy change announced by the Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge, discussed in the next section. However, unrepresented asylum
seekers, the most vulnerable group, will likely not be aided—and may
well be further disadvantaged—by the policy change.
III. THE CURRENT SITUATION: AN INCOMPLETE SOLUTION DEEPENS
THE DIVIDE BETWEEN REPRESENTED AND PRO SE ASYLUM SEEKERS
A. The EOIR Changes its Policy and Now Allows Filing of Asylum
Applications at the Court Window
On September 14, 2016, EOIR’s Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge issued a memo announcing a major policy change to allow
asylum seekers to file their I-589 Applications for Asylum at the court
window, rather than waiting to file at their scheduled master calendar
hearing,131 which is often set beyond the one-year deadline.132 The

because their system reflected that an NTA has been issued and the asylum seeker is in
removal proceedings. Asylum division Chief, John Lafferty, made clear that an I-589
will only be rejected if it is clear from their internal database that an NTA has been
filed with the court, indicating that EOIR retains jurisdiction over the case. Meeting
Agenda and Unofficial Notes for USCIS Asylum Division, Quarterly Stakeholder
Meeting,
AILA
Doc.
No.
15111204
(August
7,
2015),
http://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-asylum-division-liaison-minutes-08-07-15
[https://perma.cc/6L3S-7ZZH]. This is currently in question, however, as the San
Francisco asylum office has issued letters claiming a lack of jurisdiction for asylum
cases filed where the NTA has not yet been filed with the court. See Letter from S.F.
Asylum Office, to author (Mar. 26, 2015) (on file with author).
Other times, USCIS initially accepted the I-589 but then rejected it at a later
stage—after biometrics are taken or even a few days prior to interview. For example,
two of the plaintiffs in the Mendez Rojas complaint filed their asylum applications
affirmatively while they waited for DHS to place them in removal proceeding after
passing credible fear interviews, and USCIS rejected both applications. Motion for
Class Certification, supra note 110 (explaining that USCIS rejected applications for
asylum from plaintiffs Rodriguez and Lopez because the agency assumed they were in
removal proceedings, despite the fact that DHS had not filed the NTAs for either case
with the immigration court prior to the deadline, and EOIR also rejected Mr.
Rodriguez’s attempted asylum filing for lack of jurisdiction because he was not in
removal proceedings).
130. GROSSMAN & HARRIS, supra note 126, at 6, 8–9. This argument is still
highly relevant and will be discussed in Part IV. Individuals who have undergone a
credible fear interview, had no hearing scheduled prior to one year and no notice of the
deadline, and missed the deadline, should still make this argument.
131. Memorandum from Michael C. McGoings, supra note 7, at 2.
132. GROSSMAN & HARRIS, supra note 126, at 1.
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memo announces that EOIR will amend the Immigration Court Practice
Manual133 and “other guidance documents.”134
The change announced by EOIR, allowing for the filing of asylum
applications at the court window,135 is a simple, logical fix. It will ease
the cumbersome and onerous burden on attorneys to undertake
measures to prove attempts to file, in the absence of an actual
opportunity to file. The policy change will benefit asylum seekers
represented by competent counsel, who, as long as their attorney files
before the deadline with the court window, will unquestionably have
met the one-year filing deadline, where this certainty was not possible
before. Importantly, the change harmonizes practice throughout the
nation’s immigration courts and standardizes a procedure of accepting
“lodging” as filing that had already been adopted in several courts
across the country.136 Further, it was in the agency’s own interest to
make this change. In their report to the Administrative Conference of
the United States, Lenni Benson and Russell Wheeler suggest that

133. Indeed, when the practice manual was first issued, the August 2009 cover
memo by then-Chief Immigration Judge Brian O’Leary made clear that the document
was
“living.”
See
IMMIGRATION
COURT
PRACTICE
MANUAL,
Cover
Memo
(U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/02/02/practice_manual_review.pd
f [https://perma.cc/K62Q-K8ZQ] (“The Immigration Court Practice manual is intended
to be a ‘living document’ and the Office of Chief Immigration Judge updates it in
response to changes in law and policy, as well as in response to comments by the
parties using it.”).
134. Memorandum from Michael C. McGoings, supra note 7, at 3.
135. Id. at 2. Curiously, EOIR did not abolish the “lodging” practice created
by the A-B-T- settlement. Id. at 2–3. Most attorneys believe that an individual would be
benefitted by both lodging and filing at the same time—i.e. starting the work
authorization “clock” and simultaneously meeting the one-year deadline. In informal
conversation, however, a few attorneys can see an advantage to being able to lodge an
application sooner than filing. If, for example, the attorney and asylum seeker needed
longer to fully flesh out the application and wanted to submit a more detailed version to
the court for the purposes of filing, lodging may allow this. The court does not actually
retain a copy of the lodged asylum application, but will do so when the application is
filed. IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.15(1)(i). Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(c)
(2016), an immigration judge or asylum officer can permit an asylum seeker to amend
or supplement an application that has already been filed as a matter of discretion.
136. Complaint—Class Action for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and
Mandamus at 18, Mendez Rojas v. Johnson, No. 2:16-cv-01024-RSM
(W.D.
Wash.
filed
July
21
2016),
https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/our_lit/2016_30Jun_roj
as-v-johnson.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q45N-PE8J] (explaining that immigration judges in
Omaha, Philadelphia, Charlotte, Cleveland, San Francisco, and Seattle allow lodging to
constitute filing, but the Los Angeles court does not consider lodging as filing and in
other courts, including Houston, Baltimore, Chicago, San Diego, New Orleans,
Denver, and Portland, courts have made it clear that each immigration judge retains
discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether lodging constitutes filing for
one-year purposes). See supra note 128 for a more detailed explanation of “lodging.”
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amending the practice manual to eliminate the requirement that asylum
applications be filed in open court would increase immigration court
efficiency.137
Why did it take EOIR so long to make this change? One of the
agency’s justifications for mandating the in-court filing of an asylum
application was the need for an immigration judge to issue the
“frivolous” advisal to asylum seekers—advising them of the
consequences of filing a frivolous application for asylum,138 which can
be a permanent bar on any and all immigration benefits in the United
States.139 As the September 14, 2016 memo recognizes, this important
advisal could be given at a later master calendar hearing or at the
individual merits hearing.140 It is also worth noting that the I-589
Application for asylum itself includes the warning regarding the filing
of a frivolous application in writing and requires the applicant to sign
under penalty of perjury.141
This new approach is analogous to the affirmative asylum system—
which provides no frivolous filing advisal at the time of filing.142 To file
affirmatively, an asylum seeker simply signs the I-589, which includes
the frivolous advisal, and then mails the application to a USCIS service
center.143 The asylum seeker does not interact with a USCIS official
until the day of the asylum interview, when the asylum officer gives
them the warning and has them sign the application again.144 It appears
that EOIR has come to recognize that an immigration judge can
adequately give an in person frivolous filing advisal at the time that the
application is about to be adjudicated at an individual hearing in open
court.145
Although this rule change brings clarity and uniformity for asylum
seekers represented by competent attorneys, without further reform
from EOIR and USCIS, the rule is completely inadequate for pro se
137. Benson & Wheeler, supra note 6, at 79.
138. INA § 208.4(d)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(4) (2012).
139. See 8. C.F.R. § 208.20.
140. Memorandum from Michael C. McGoings, supra note 7, at 3. Further,
the immigration court employee accepting the filing at the window could give the
advisal orally and/or provide it in writing. See Benson & Wheeler, supra note 6, at 79.
141. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. ET AL., I-589 APPLICATION FOR ASYLUM AND
FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL 9 https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i589.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH3Y-KHSP] (lasted visited Oct. 23, 2016). The frivolous
asylum application warning, along with a space for the asylum seeker to sign under
penalty of perjury is found on page 9 of the I-589 Application form for asylum. See id.
142. Ndibu v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 229, 234–35 (4th Cir. 2016).
143. GROSSMAN & HARRIS, supra note 126, at 2.
144. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. ET AL.,, supra note 141, at 10 (providing a
space for the asylum seeker to sign the application at an affirmative asylum interview
(Part F) or a space for the asylum seeker to sign the application in court (Part G)).
145. Memorandum from Michael C. McGoings, supra note 7, at 3.
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asylum seekers. Unrepresented asylum seekers typically lack
knowledge of not only the one-year deadline, but also the procedure for
“lodging” or filing an asylum application at the immigration court
window.146 Outside of the immigration context, eighty-nine percent of
state-level trial judges surveyed by the American Bar Association in
2010 said that unrepresented litigants suffer from “procedural
errors.”147 Procedural rules, such as the technicalities around the oneyear filing deadline, can “govern a party’s ability to gain initial access
to the legal system.”148 The problems of a lack of representation for
asylum seekers are likely even deeper, as asylum seekers are more
likely to be non-English speakers and survivors of trauma.149 As it
currently stands, the policy change does not offer meaningful relief for
unrepresented asylum seekers, widening the gulf in outcomes between
represented and pro se asylum seekers.
Further, the policy change introduces new uncertainties for those
asylum seekers whose diligent counsel “lodged” an application with the
court prior to September 14, 2016. Presumably the EOIR memo will
benefit those who managed to “lodge” their asylum application at the
court window prior to the one-year deadline and that judges will now
construe that “lodging” as “filing,” but the memo does not make that
clear.150 Further, nothing in the EOIR memo discusses what will happen
in the cases for individuals who lodged their applications with the
immigration court window before the one-year deadline, and yet an
immigration judge found them to be barred from asylum.151 Should
146. Complaint, supra note 136, at 18.
147. See Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People's
Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 756 (2015) (citing Linda Klein, Report on the Survey of
Judges on the Impact of the Economic Downturn on Representation in the Courts (July
12, 2010)) (discussing the ABA 2010 study and explaining the procedural and
substantive hurdles for pro se litigants in the civil context).
148. Id. at 795–96 (explaining how pro se litigants are “likely to default on any
one of a number of procedural obligations they must fulfill in order to have their cases
fully heard or to avail themselves of a remedy ordered by the court”).
149. Id. at 758–59 (explaining that non-English speakers, individuals with
mental disabilities, survivors of domestic violence, and overwhelmed single mothers are
particularly disadvantaged as pro se litigants).
150. Memorandum from Michael C. McGoings, supra note 7, at 2–3.
151. Id. The Author is aware of a case in the Fifth Circuit in which this is
precisely at issue. The following facts are recounted based on the Author’s phone
conversation with the attorney, Imran Beg Mirza, who runs a private practice in
Houston, Texas, in late 2015 and email correspondence before that date. The asylum
seeker did not timely file for asylum because he did not have a master calendar hearing
scheduled within one year of his arrival. In that case, the attorney lodged the
application at the court window and filed affirmatively, but did not file a motion to
advance the master calendar hearing to permit timely filing. The immigration judge
found that the applicant was barred from asylum for failure to meet the deadline and
found the applicant did not meet the withholding standard. The BIA affirmed the
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those individuals file a motion to reopen? What if they are beyond the
regulatory period to file such a motion?
The next section discusses two case studies that exemplify the
injustice for pro se asylum seekers the September 2016 policy change
did not address, and foreshadow the increasingly disparate outcomes for
asylum seekers with and without competent representation absent
additional reforms. Both of the asylum seekers discussed below were
unrepresented until after their one-year filing deadline. Although both
underwent credible fear interviews, neither received notice of the
requirement to file an application for asylum, and both missed the filing
deadline. In both cases, judges found no extraordinary circumstances to
excuse the untimely filings, and both asylum seekers were barred from
receiving asylum protection.
B. Case Studies of Asylum Seekers Barred from Protection by the
Deadline and Backlog
No precedential decisions guide the adjudication of the one-year
bar when it intersects with the immigration court backlog. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA)—the highest immigration-specific tribunal
in the United States—and the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
have yet to address this issue. In this section, two case studies, from
Maryland and Texas, highlight the issue and preview how, in the
absence of further instruction from EOIR, similar outcomes could play
out in asylum cases across the nation.
1. SALVADORAN SURVIVOR OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BARRED FROM
ASYLUM IN BALTIMORE
Liana is a young mother and survivor of domestic violence from
the Northern Triangle region of Central America.152 At age fifteen,
Liana became involved with Manuel; while initially sweet and loving,
Manuel quickly became jealous, possessive, and controlling. Liana
became pregnant at the age of sixteen, dropped out of school, and
immigration judge’s decision. In Khadiwal v. Lynch, No. 15-60310, 2016 WL
3611554, at *1, *4 (5th Cir. July 5, 2016), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s
decision in a short per curiam opinion. The court declined to even reach the issue of the
one-year deadline because, they said, the BIA had failed to reach the issue. Id. at *2.
The Author has attempted to contact the attorney on the case for the BIA decision and
for further details but been has unsuccessful in receiving a response from the attorney.
152. Names have been changed to protect confidentiality and some details have
been generalized or redacted. Liana consented to the use of her story in this Article.
Feminine pronouns are used for all immigration judges or Board of Appeals members
referenced. The Author currently represents Liana on appeal before the BIA and is
personally acquainted with the facts in this case as Liana's representative.
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moved in with Manuel and his mother. Manuel forbade her from
leaving the house and began to control and monitor her whereabouts.
After the baby was born, Manuel raped Liana approximately three
times a week, ripping off her clothes, and forcing himself on her,
claiming it was his right as she was “his woman.” Over seven years of
repeated rapes, Manuel verbally abused Liana, repeatedly threatened
her life, and became involved with the M-18 gang, a powerful
transnational organization operating in El Salvador and throughout
Central America. After one particularly violent incident in front of their
child, Liana finally managed to leave the home she shared with
Manuel. But, Manuel never accepted that she had left and, for the next
two years, he harassed her: stalking her daily; calling her up to ten
times a day, despite changing her phone number multiple times;
physically assaulting a male co-worker with whom he suspected she
was romantically involved; and arranged for a gang member friend to
threaten to kill her if she did not return to him. Convinced that it was
only a matter of time before these threats rang true and she would be
killed, Liana left her mother, daughter, and sister in El Salvador and
sought protection in the United States.
Liana entered the United States in October 2012 and, after a short
initial period of detention, ICE released her on parole to join a family
member in Maryland. She eventually underwent a credible fear
interview in March 2013. There are two particularly notable aspects of
Liana’s credible fear interview. First, she was interviewed outside of
detention. Most asylum seekers who undergo a credible fear interview
are detained and may or may not be released after a positive decision is
rendered.153 Second, Liana’s prior attorney accompanied Liana to her
credible fear interview.154 Before, during, and after that interview, the

153. Michele R. Pistone, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: A Proposal for
Ending the Unnecessary Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 197, 234
(1999). In July 2015, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson made it clear that families
undergoing the credible fear process would be released if a positive decision was
rendered. Jeh Johnson, Written Testimony of DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson for a House
Committee on the Judiciary hearing titled: “Oversight of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security,” DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(July 14, 2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/07/14/written-testimony-dhs-secretary-johnson-housecommittee-judiciary-hearing-titled- [https://perma.cc/K9UQ-6X2A].
154.
INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iv) (2012) (“An alien
who is eligible for such [credible fear] interview may consult with a person or persons
of the alien’s choosing prior to the interview or any review thereof, according to
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. Such consultation shall be at no
expense to the Government and shall not unreasonably delay the process.”); 8 C.F.R. §
208.30(d)(4) (2016) (adding that a representative may be permitted, at the asylum
officer’s discretion, to present a statement at the end of the interview); see also
Memorandum from Joseph E. Langlois, INS Office of Int’l Affairs, to Asylum
Directors, Supervisory Asylum Officers, Asylum Officers (Nov. 14, 1997).
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attorney failed to advise Liana as to the one-year deadline, and the
asylum office also failed to give any instruction as to the deadline.155
The asylum officer determined that Liana had established a significant
possibility of eligibility for asylum based on her fear of harm from her
former partner, based on her membership in the particular social group
of Salvadoran women unable to leave a domestic relationship.156 The
asylum office issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) to Liana, referring her
to immigration court to proceed with her application for asylum before
an immigration judge. (It is worth noting that nothing in the NTA nor
the asylum officer’s interaction with Liana made clear that she should
file an application for asylum in immigration court, and nothing made it
clear that she had to within one year of her arrival in the United States
in order to preserve her claim for protection.) While this NTA made
clear that Liana was being referred to the Baltimore immigration court,
it did not indicate a date, time, or judge before whom she was to
appear. A second NTA, listing a judge, date, and time at which to
appear in immigration court, was not actually issued until after Liana’s
one-year deadline in October 2013.
Liana obtained pro bono representation in January 2014 and filed
her I-589 Application for Asylum shortly thereafter at the very first
scheduled master calendar hearing, in February 2014.157 Despite
extensive briefing and record evidence making abundantly clear the
lack of a mechanism by which Liana could file her application within
one year, the judge found that her asylum claim was barred by her
failure to meet the one-year deadline.158 Specifically, the judge stated in
her holding on the deadline:
155.
A bar complaint was later filed against the law firm representing Liana at
the credible fear interview with the District of Columbia’s Bar.
156.
For a detailed overview of the current state of asylum law as applied to
survivors of domestic violence seeking protection, see Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based
Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving Standards and Fair Application of the Law,
22 SW. J. INT'L L. 1 (2016).
157. The Center for Applied Legal Studies, the asylum clinic at Georgetown
University Law Center, provided pro bono representation. At the time, the Author
served as a Supervising Attorney and Clinical Teaching Fellow within the clinic. The
Author supervised the students handling the merits hearing, and the Author represented
Liana pro bono on appeal before the BIA and currently on remand before the
immigration court.
158. In assessing Liana’s claim for withholding of removal, a lesser form of
protection in the United States that does not require the filing of an application within
one year of entry, the judge found that Liana was ineligible as he found that she was
not a member of the particular social group of Salvadoran women unable to leave a
domestic relationship. Matter of V-C-, (B.I.A. Apr. 2015) (on file with author).
Specifically, the judge found that she had “left” the relationship because she physically
stopped residing with her abuser, the father of her child, despite the fact that he stalked,
harassed, threatened, grabbed her routinely, and had a gang member threaten to kill
her. Id. at 9.
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Looking first to the respondent’s claim that essentially had
the, as the Court understands it, had the court system been
more efficient and she had a hearing at an earlier date, then
she would have had an opportunity to file the application for
asylum, and therefore she would not have missed the one-year
bar, the Court finds no merit in that argument whatsoever.
The process is such that she did not get the individual hearing
date until a later time. Ignorance of the law is no excuse for
failing to file an application for asylum.159
Although the immigration judge in this case relied on the maxim
“ignorance of the law is no excuse,” the judge fundamentally missed
the point that even if Liana been aware of the law, there was no
possible way for her to file on time because she did not have a master
calendar hearing scheduled until after her one-year deadline.
Liana appealed the immigration judge’s decision in her case to the
BIA in May 2015.160 On November 1, 2016, the BIA issued an
unpublished decision, reversing the immigration judge’s decision on the
one-year filing deadline. The Board stated:
Under the particular circumstances presented in this case,
where the respondent filed her asylum application at the
earliest opportunity at her initial master calendar hearing, the
scheduling of which was outside of her control, we conclude
that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ test of section
208(a)(2)(D) of the Act has been satisfied and that the
respondent filed her asylum application within a reasonable
period given those circumstances.161

159. Id. at 7. A bar complaint was filed against the immigration law firm that
represented Liana at her credible fear interview based in large part on their failure to
advise her of the one-year deadline upon termination of services due to her inability to
continue to pay their fees. Id. at 7–8. On that issue, the judge found that the attorney’s
passing mention of “something to do with one year” sufficed as effective assistance of
counsel. Id.
160. The Author’s briefing was accompanied by an amicus brief on the issue of
the one-year deadline and the immigration court backlog, and a separate amicus brief
on the underlying merits of Liana’s gender-based asylum claim. The brief on the oneyear filing deadline and backlog was filed by Human Rights First and Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLC (on file with author). The brief on the gender-based asylum
issues was filed by the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies at the University of
California, Hastings, School of Law (on file with author).
161. In
re:
V-C-,
(B.I.A.
Nov.
1,
2016)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_6gbFPjVDoxdy1faEs2MlJKT0U/edit
[https://perma.cc/3M9H-DYFD] (on file with author). Daniel M. Kowalski, BIA
Asylum Remand; El Salvador; Domestic Violence; One-Year Bar, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL
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The BIA reversed other erroneous findings by the immigration judge,
finding Liana to be a member of the particular social group of
“Salvadoran women unable to leave a domestic relationship” and
remanding to a different immigration judge to consider the remaining
issues in the case. Although this is a hopeful turn of events for Liana,
the erroneous initial decision by the immigration judge led to more than
a year-and-a-half’s delay in adjudication, and the ultimate length of the
delay is yet to be determined, as Liana’s case still must be adjudicated
on remand. Further, although the BIA issued a favorable decision on
the one-year filing deadline, they did not designate the case as binding
precedent, so the finding that filing at the first available master calendar
where the hearing was set beyond the one-year deadline cannot
meaningfully guide the consistent and efficient adjudication of this issue
in other courts across the nation.
2. HONDURAN SURVIVOR OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BARRED FROM
ASYLUM IN TEXAS
Yesenia, a native of one of the Northern Triangle countries of
Central America, is a survivor of domestic violence at the hands of her
partner.162 Yesenia’s abusive partner subjected her to verbal, physical,
and sexual abuse for two years. One particularly violent incident
resulted in Yesenia miscarrying the couple’s unborn baby.163 After this,
her abuser kidnapped and held her for eight days, raping and verbally
abusing her during that time.164 Receiving no help from the police,
Yesenia fled.165
Yesenia arrived in the United States to seek protection in early
July 2011.166 After a brief period of detention, during which time she
underwent and passed a credible fear interview, Yesenia was released.
She did not receive a date to appear in immigration court, however,
until more than a year later, in October 2012, when she confirmed that
she wished to apply for asylum and requested that the venue be changed

NEWSROOM
IMMIGRATION
LAW
(Nov.
11,
2016,
2:18
PM),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/insidenews/archive/2016/11
/11/unpub-bia-asylum-remand-el-salvador-domestic-violence-one-yearbar.aspx?Redirected=true [https://perma.cc/DLY8-2W8D].
162. Name and details have been changed to protect confidentiality, and in
recognition of the sensitivities of discussing a case currently on appeal. The Author
gained familiarity with Yesenia’s case through contact with the attorney representing
this individual on appeal.
163. Written Decision of Immigration Judge, at 6 (Tex. May 6, 2014)
[hereinafter Yesenia IJ Decision] (on file with author).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 7.
166. Id. at 5.
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from one immigration court in Texas to another court much closer to
where she was living.167 Yesenia’s next immigration court hearing was
scheduled for April 2013, where she requested more time to find
representation.168 She appeared a month later, in May 2013, with
counsel, and requested relief from removal in the form of asylum.169
She actually filed her I-589 application form for asylum on July 10,
2013.170
During her individual merits hearing before the immigration judge,
Yesenia explained that she believed that she had filed for asylum when
she underwent her credible fear interview and explained her fear of
return to her home country.171 Further, she received no instruction
telling her that she needed to file another application of any kind in
order to apply for asylum.172
Despite the immigration judge’s clear understanding of the fact
that Yesenia was given no practical opportunity to file her asylum
application and had expressed her fear of return during a credible fear
interview, she found Yesenia barred from asylum.173 Yesenia’s counsel
argued that the language of the Immigration and Nationality Act and
attendant regulations support construing undergoing a credible fear
interview as “filing” for asylum.174 The judge, however, drew a
technical distinction between “filing” an application and “initiating” the

167. Id. at 2, 6 (“The Court asked the Respondent if she wanted to proceed
with her asylum application or if she preferred to apply for voluntary departure. The
Respondent stated that she wished to apply for asylum. At that time, the Respondent’s
case was transferred to Dallas. No mention was made by the immigration judge
regarding the Respondent’s responsibility to file a documentary application for asylum.
The Respondent discovered she was required to file a Form I-589 when she first
appeared before the Dallas Immigration Court with her attorney. Her attorney informed
her about the one-year filing deadline.”).
168. Id. at 2.
169. Id. at 2–3.
170. Id. at 3.
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 19.
174. Id. at 13–14. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012)
(“If the officer determines at the time of the [credible fear] interview that an alien has a
credible fear of persecution . . . the alien shall be detained for further consideration of
the application for asylum.”) (emphasis added). Yesenia’s counsel also cited to the
agreement between the United States and Canada regarding applications for asylum,
which states that “[c]learly, then, the credible fear interview process constitutes the
initiation of the asylum application process described in section 208(a)(1) o[f] the Act (8
U.S.C. 1158(a)(1)).” Implementation of the Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Canada Regarding Asylum Claims
Made in Transit and at Land Border Ports-of-Entry, 69 Fed. Reg. 69,480, 69,481
(Nov. 29, 2004).
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asylum process.175 The judge further found that the regulations are
explicit in making clear that asylum applications must be filed on paper,
so an “oral application made during a credible fear interview” would
not constitute filing.176
Finding Yesenia barred from asylum by her failure to meet the
deadline, the judge then considered whether her delayed filing was
excused by an extraordinary circumstance under INA § 208(a)(2)(D).
The judge concluded that there was no “unwarranted delay” by EOIR,
despite the fact that Yesenia’s initial master calendar was not scheduled
until one year after arrival.177 The judge reasoned that although
Yesenia’s master calendar hearing was set beyond the one-year
deadline, she could have found an attorney between the time of her
release from detention and her filing deadline who would have “been
able to inform her of the deadline and assist her in timely filing her
asylum application.”178 Finally, the judge ruled, just like the judge in
Liana’s case, “ignorance of the law does not excuse noncompliance
therewith.”179 To this judge, the fact that Yesenia was unaware of the
filing deadline and thought she had filed for asylum was irrelevant to
whether or not she would be permitted to pursue her application.180 The
judge continued to consider Yesenia’s eligibility for withholding of
removal, which does not require filing within one year, but denied that
claim due to a misunderstanding of the law and errors in applying
asylum law to survivors of domestic violence.181

175. Yesenia IJ Decision, supra note 163, at 14 (“Section 208(a)(2)(B) of the
Act requires that an alien demonstrate ‘by clear and convincing evidence that the
[asylum] application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in
the United States,’ not merely that the asylum application process has been initiated.”).
176. Id. at 15 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4 (2016) (explaining where asylum
applications may be filed), and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3 (2016) (“an asylum applicant must
file Form I-589”) (emphasis added)).
177. Id. at 17.
178. Id. at 18.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 18–19.
181. This particular immigration judge’s errors in reasoning on a woman’s
“ability to leave” her relationship would be worthy of an entirely separate law review
article. The particular social group in this case was defined as “Honduran women who
are viewed as property by virtue of their positions in a domestic relationship” or
“Honduran women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave.” Id. at 19.
The Author notes, however, that this decision was issued in May 2014, prior to
the BIA’s precedent decision being issued in Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388,
388–89 (B.I.A. 2014), making clear that “married women in Guatemala who are unable
to leave their relationship” are a valid particular social group. The judge in this case
would likely have been one to draw a distinction between a marital and non-marital
relationship and took issue with the term “domestic relationship” as immutable,
particular, and socially distinct, but perhaps the judge would have ruled differently
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In March 2016, the BIA affirmed the judge’s denial of Yesenia’s
asylum.182 In dismissing the appeal, the BIA focused on whether
Yesenia was a member of a cognizable particular social group, and
distinguished the case from the BIA’s precedent decision on domestic
violence claims, issued in August 2014, Matter of A-R-C-G-.183 Because
the BIA found that Yesenia was eligible for neither asylum nor
withholding, the BIA member writing the decision found that the
judge’s decision regarding the one-year deadline did not violate her due
process rights because it did not cause her substantial prejudice.184
Yesenia appealed the BIA’s negative decision to the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals.185
It is worth noting that both Yesenia and Liana are seeking asylum
as women fleeing domestic violence at the hands of their partners and,
in Liana’s case, fear of harm from a transnational criminal organization
in Central America. As previously mentioned, the asylum filing
deadline disproportionately affects women, even prior to the
immigration court backlog, further compounding the problem. These
two cases are in fact quite representative of the current population of
individuals seeking asylum protection in the United States.186
C. Federal Court Challenge to the Lack of Notice and Opportunity to
File
The problem discussed in this Article posed by the one-year
deadline and the immigration court backlog is in fact so widespread that
on June 30, 2016, four asylum seekers filed a class action lawsuit in the
Western District of Washington, challenging the lack of notice of the
one-year deadline and the absence of a meaningful opportunity to file

post-A-R-C-G- or at least had to work to distinguish Yesenia’s case from that
precedential decision.
182. Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, at 5 (Va. 2016) (on file
with author).
183. Id. at 2–4.
184. Id. at 5.
185. Briefing in the case is currently stayed at the Fifth Circuit pending
discussions between Yesenia’s attorneys and the Office of Immigration Litigation. Email from Yesenia’s att’y, to author (Sept. 26, 2016) (on file with author).
186. See generally UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON
THE RUN: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA,
HONDURAS,
AND
MEXICO
(Oct.
2015),
http://www.unhcr.org/enus/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html [https://perma.cc/G9JU-G3GE]
(exploring forced migration of increasing numbers of women from Central America and
Mexico to the United States, fleeing violence at the hands of powerful gangs and
violence in the home).
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within one year of arrival in the United States.187 Notably, this suit was
filed prior to EOIR’s September 14, 2016 policy change, and indeed
the change may have been prompted by the lawsuit, which is ongoing at
the time of writing this Article.
The case, Mendez Rojas v. Johnson,188 alleges that DHS violates
the Immigration and Nationality Act, its implementing regulations, and
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) based on lack of notice of the
one-year deadline.189 Further, the complaint alleges that this lack of
notice is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.190 Finally, the plaintiffs are suing all
defendants, including departments within DHS-USCIS, ICE, CBP, and
the Department of Justice-EOIR, for violations of the INA, APA
regulations, and the Due Process Clause based on a lack of a uniform
procedural mechanism by which to timely file an asylum application.191
The July 2016 motion for class certification is currently pending.192
This lawsuit has the potential to change the dynamics and provide
relief for asylum seekers nationwide who did not receive notice of the
one-year deadline and who were unable, procedurally, to file within
one year. The plaintiffs’ concerns have only partially been addressed by
the EOIR policy change—now individuals with notice of the one-year
deadline and the way in which to meet the deadline do indeed have a
meaningful opportunity to file within one year. Currently, however, the
United States government fails to give notice to asylum seekers of their
obligation to file for asylum. Consequently, only individuals who
secure competent legal representation are likely to actually meet the
deadline by filing the I-589 application for asylum with the court
window before the one-year mark.

187. Complaint, supra note 136. The case was brought by Northwest
Immigrant Rights Project, National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
the American Immigration Council, and Dobrin & Han, PC.
188. No. 2:16-cv-01024-RSM (W.D. Wash. filed June 30, 2016).
189. Id. at 35–37.
190. Id. at 36–38. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Plaintiffs argue that they have protected
interests in applying for asylum and not being removed from the United States to
countries where they fear persecution and that the Due Process Clause entitles them to a
fair hearing of their asylum claim, including notice of the deadline to apply. Complaint,
supra note 136, at 35–38.
191. Complaint, supra note 136, at 1–3.
192. Motion for Class Certification, supra note 110.
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IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

The number of asylum seekers in the United States continues to
grow, reflective of the worldwide trend of an increase in displaced
persons.193 At the same time, the immigration court backlog shows no
signs of abating, despite efforts to hire additional immigration judges.194
Following the 2016 Presidential election, Donald Trump has announced
his plans to deport two to three million immigrants, which will, of
course, further exacerbate the immigration court backlog.195 Despite the
recent policy change announced through the Chief Immigration Judge’s
memo, asylum seekers unable to secure legal representation prior the
one-year filing deadline still lack a meaningful opportunity to timely
file their applications for asylum.
With pending class action litigation and a smattering of decisions at
the immigration judge level, there is a growing need for a uniform and
fair approach to this thorny problem, which looms large on the horizon.
In short, the government’s current practice makes it close to impossible
for pro se asylum seekers to receive the due process to which they are
constitutionally entitled in their removal proceedings.
This part of the Article outlines the necessary solutions to the
brewing disaster described above, now most acute for pro se asylum
seekers. Some of the solutions focus on addressing the one-year
deadline specifically and some on the immigration court backlog. Both
of these issues, as discussed throughout this Article, pose problems in
other arenas and independently should be solved. But the interaction of
the two has introduced new problems and the solutions below
specifically target the result of this dangerous interplay. The first subsection discusses reforms to address the one-year filing deadline. The
second sub-section discusses reforms aimed at addressing the
immigration court backlog. The third and final sub-section proposes
specific reforms—complementing the recently announced EOIR policy
change and assuming that both the backlog and the one-year filing
deadline continue to exist—to solve the problem caused by the interplay
of those two phenomenas.
193. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS:
FORCED
DISPLACEMENT
IN
2015
(2016),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/unhcrsharedmedia/2016/2016-06-20-global-trends/2016-0614-Global-Trends-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/LDR6-HEQE] (sharing that a record high
of over 65.3 million people are displaced worldwide).
194. Caldwell, supra note 2.
195. See Amy B. Wang, Donald Trump plans to immediately deport 2 million
to 3 million undocumented immigrants, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/13/donald-trump-plans-toimmediately-deport-2-to-3-million-undocumented-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/PP838PMG].
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A. Reforms to Address the One-Year Filing Deadline
The most comprehensive, cleanest solution to the myriad problems
posed by the one-year deadline is, of course, for Congress to repeal the
deadline through a statutory fix.196 Numerous critics have repeatedly
called for this overhaul, to no effect.197 Indeed, the most recent iteration
of the Refugee Protection Act, re-introduced in July 2016, would
specifically remove the one-year deadline.198 A legislative solution in
the current political climate—amidst animus, suspicion, and fear
directed towards immigrants, and towards refugees and asylum seekers
more specifically—seems highly improbable. Thus, this Article focuses
primarily on administrative solutions that can be taken in the absence of
congressional action.
B. Reforms to Reduce the Immigration Court Backlog
Various agency actors within the immigration system and our
government hold the power to alleviate the immigration court backlog.
1. MORE PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION BY DHS
One clear way to reduce the immigration court backlog is for the
government to be more selective about which immigrants are placed
into removal proceedings. This would require DHS to retool its
enforcement priorities and exercise prosecutorial discretion not to put
as many immigrants into removal proceedings. Specifically, in recent
years DHS and President Obama repeatedly claimed to focus on
“felons, not families.”199 Despite this, the current enforcement
196. This has, of course, been proposed in various bills introduced in Congress
over the years. See, e.g., Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 3
(2010); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2010, S. 3932, 111th Cong. § 255
(2010); Restoring Protection to Victims of Persecution Act, H.R. 4800, 111th Cong.
(2010).
197. Schrag et al., supra note 30, at 765 (“Congress should repeal the deadline
for the sake of genuine asylum seekers, the efficiency and accuracy of asylum
adjudication, and the reduction of unnecessary government expenditure.”); Michele
Pistone & Philip Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 31 (2001) (“The best solution would be to repeal the one-year deadline.
. . .”); see also HEARTLAND ALLIANCE ET AL., supra note 42, at 10–11; HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 29, at 42 (clearly stating that the deadline should be
eliminated).
198. Refugee Protection Act of 2016, S. 3214, 114th Cong. § 3 (2nd Sess.
2016); Refugee Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5851, 114th Cong. § 3 (2nd Sess. 2016)
(eliminating the one-year deadline).
199. The White House Office of Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in
Address to the Nation on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-
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priorities include recent border crossers, who are largely women and
children fleeing violence in Central America and seeking protection in
the United States.200 DHS should retool its enforcement priorities and
actually focus more narrowly on putting individuals with serious
criminal convictions into removal proceedings. This shift in priorities
would create additional bandwidth to adjudicate asylum and other
claims for relief from removal that often must be adjudicated in
immigration court.201
Further, DHS can limit the use of expedited removal, which
contributes to the backlog in both the immigration courts and the
asylum offices.202 In Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-,203 DHS itself argued
that it had discretion to not place individuals into expedited removal,
and could instead place them directly into removal proceedings.204 As a
matter of policy, the agency may also determine to not apply expedited
removal to a group of individuals. For example, in 1997, the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) announced that it would
not place unaccompanied minors into expedited removal, instead
charging them with grounds of inadmissibility that placed them in

nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/HA8J-C78U] (“Felons, not families. Criminals,
not children. Gang members, not a mom who’s working hard to provide for her kids.
We’ll prioritize, just like law enforcement does every day.”); Remarks By Secretary Of
Homeland Security Jeh C. Johnson At Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute 2015
Public Policy Conference, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/10/07/remarks-secretary-homeland-security-jeh-cjohnson-congressional-hispanic-caucus [https://perma.cc/S8WS-ELKN] (“Felons not
families. Quality over quantity. Give people an opportunity to come forward and be
held accountable, and be accountable.”).
200. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement et al.
on
Policies
for
the
Apprehension,
Detention,
and
Removal
of
Undocumented
Immigrants
(Nov.
20,
2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_disc
retion.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z473-XG6V] (stating priority 2(c) to be “aliens
apprehended anywhere in the United States after unlawfully entering or re-entering the
United States and who cannot establish to the satisfaction of an immigration officer that
they have been physically present in the United States continuously since January 1,
2014”).
201. For fantastic explanations on the use of prosecutorial discretion in the
immigration context, see SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION–THE
ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015); Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L.
REV. 1285 (2015).
202. Frequently Asked Questions: Asylum Seekers and the Expedited
Removal
Process,
HUM.
RTS.
FIRST
(Nov.
2015),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/FAQ-asylum-seekers-and-theexpedited-removal-process.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DXZ-9CAQ].
203. 25 I. & N. Dec. 520 (B.I.A. 2011).
204. Id.
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regular removal proceedings.205 In 2009, ICE directed all field offices
to no longer put immigrant families into expedited removal and to
instead place them into regular removal proceedings.206 Reducing the
number of expedited removals would assist in reducing the backlog
because, currently, immigration judges must review any negative
credible fear determinations issued by USCIS asylum officers.207
Further, immigration judges must oversee bond hearings for detained
asylum seekers undergoing the credible fear process that results from
claiming a fear in expedited removal proceedings.208 Thus, limiting the
use of expedited removal where individuals have expressed a fear of
return to their home country will help to reduce the backlog in
immigration court.

205. See MICHAEL JOHN CARCIA & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: CURRENT LAW GOVERNING REMOVAL FROM
THE UNITED STATES AND SELECTED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 3 (2014) (“[I]mmigration
authorities would generally charge arriving UACs who lacked proper documentation
with a ground of inadmissibility for which expedited removal is not required, so that
they could be placed in formal removal proceedings.”). This practice was later codified
with passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of
2008. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5)(D) (2012).
206. See Memorandum from David J. Venturella, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr.
and Customs Enf’t, to Field Office Dirs. on Family Detention and Intake Guidance, 2
(Aug. 14, 2009) (“DHS has broad authority to decide whether to remove aliens through
expedited removal . . . Effective immediately, discretion is to be exercised broadly in
charging family unit cases so that they are placed in removal proceedings pursuant to
Section 240 of the INA.”).
Recently the DHS Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers
emphasized that:
DHS is not required to place families in expedited or reinstatement of
removal, with their attendant policy of detention. There is clear authority
for holding that immigration officials have the discretion to refer any
individual who could be subject to expedited removal or reinstatement or
removal to regular Section 240 removal proceedings before an immigration
judge instead.
REPORT
OF
THE
DHS
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
ON
FAMILY
RESIDENTIAL
CENTERS
5
(2016)
(citations
omitted),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V6AX-DGDS].
207. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(g)(2) (2016).
208. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41753, ASYLUM
AND “CREDIBLE FEAR” ISSUES IN U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 1 (2011).
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2. FURTHER INCREASE THE NUMBER OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND
JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS
Significantly increasing the number of immigration judges and law
clerks would also have the effect of reducing the backlog.209
Incremental progress has been made in this regard. For example, the
federal budget for fiscal year 2016 included funding to support an
additional fifty-five immigration judge teams.210 Funding has not,
however, increased on-par with the need for adjudicators to address the
current backlog. To truly address the immigration court backlog would
require robust additional congressional appropriations,211 which has
proven challenging over the years despite congressional readiness to
increase the allocation of resources for the individuals targeting and
apprehending immigrants to place into the removal hearings over which
judges must preside.212 Funding has also dramatically increased for the
detention of immigrants and asylum seekers.213

209. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 99, at iv (advocating for Congress to
authorize and appropriate funds to hire an additional 150 immigration judge teams—
including law clerks and support staff—over a period of two years).
OF
JUSTICE,
FY
2016
BUDGET
SUMMARY
9,
210. DEP’T
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/pages/attachments/2015/02/02/2016_bud
get_summary_pages_5-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/E29Q-FSDE] (last visited Aug. 26,
2016). Immigration Judge teams include “an immigration judge, a language specialist, a
legal technician, a clerk, a law clerk, and one administrative support position. In
addition, every two Immigration Judge Teams would share a BIA attorney and a
paralegal.” Joshua Breisblatt, The President’s FY 2016 Budget, NAT’L IMMIGRATION
FORUM (Feb. 6, 2015), https://immigrationforum.org/blog/the-presidents-fy-2016budget-department-of-justice/ [https://perma.cc/84S7-ZTZP].
211. Human Rights First recommends the hiring of an additional 150
immigration judge teams in FY2017 and FY2018 to address the backlog. See HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, Reducing the Immigration Court Backlog and Delays (July 2016),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-Backgrounder-ImmigrationCourts.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EHE-K7DL].
212. In recent years, funding has consistently increased for enforcement actions
but not for the adjudication that necessarily results from that enforcement action. See
Mark Noferi, DHS Funding Controversy Over, but Enforcement-First Approach
Remains,
IMMIGRATION
IMPACT
(Mar.
6,
2015),
http://immigrationimpact.com/2015/03/06/dhs-funding-controversy-enforcement-firstapproach-remains/ [https://perma.cc/J8LU-NLH4]; see also AM. IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL, supra note 100; Benson & Wheeler, supra note 6, at 32–33.
213. A huge amount of money in recent years, for example, has been funneled
to detaining asylum-seeking families from Central America. See Chico Harlan, Inside
the Administration’s $1 Billion Deal to Detain Central American Asylum Seekers,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
14,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/inside-the-administrations-1billion-deal-to-detain-central-american-asylum-seekers/2016/08/14/e47f1960-581911e6-9aee-8075993d73a2_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q9YH-UTCY] (explaining the
one-billion dollar contract between ICE and Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA) to build a new family detention center in Dilley, Texas, where CCA is paid
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3. EMPOWER USCIS TO ADJUDICATE ASYLUM CASES ORIGINATING
FROM POSITIVE CREDIBLE FEAR DETERMINATIONS
To specifically reduce the number of asylum seekers contributing
to the immigration court backlog, USCIS should be empowered to fully
adjudicate asylum claims arising from credible fear interviews. Rather
than referring all individuals who pass credible fear interviews into
INA § 240 removal proceedings before an immigration judge, DHS
should instead amend their regulations in order to enable asylum
officers to exercise discretion to retain jurisdiction over certain asylum
claims and adjudicate those cases through the affirmative adjudication
system.214 Some proposals go even further than this and suggest that
EOIR amend its regulations to permit judges to administratively close
cases where an applicant has asserted asylum or withholding of removal
protection as a defense to removal, sending the case to the asylum
office for initial adjudication.215 This extra step, of course, would

regardless of whether beds are actually occupied); see also Nick Miroff, Controversial
Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigrationdetention-boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html
[https://perma.cc/P52K-74BM] (explaining that ICE detains 34,000 immigrants on any
given day).
214. The most recently proposed iteration is the Refugee Protection Act of
2016, S. 3214, 114th Cong. § 3 (2nd Sess. 2016) (proposing that the asylum office has
discretion to grant asylum under section 208 or refer to immigration court as
necessary); Refugee Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5851, 114th Cong. § 3 (2nd Sess.
2016) (stating that asylum officers conduct full asylum interviews and grant or refer
applications for asylum, rather than conducting credible fear interviews and simply
referring those with positive determinations to section 240 removal proceedings). This
proposal has been made in various iterations over the years. In 2005, the United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended that asylum officers be
empowered, in credible fear interviews, to grant asylum. Later, in 2010, the ABA
Commission on Immigration recommended the same. Benson and Wheeler, in their
report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, recommended the same.
See Benson & Wheeler, supra note 6, at 39 (recommending that USCIS amend 8
C.F.R. § 235.6 to allow asylum officers to adjudicate and approve asylum applications
where a positive result for the applicant is clear at the credible fear stage and to refer to
court if not); see also ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, BARRIERS TO
PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, U.S.
COMM’N
ON
INT’L
RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
4,
54–55
(2016),
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GP6N-8W8D] (recommending that asylum officers are allowed “to
convert and adjudicate appropriate cases in which credible fear is found as affirmative
asylum cases”).
215. Benson & Wheeler, supra note 6, at 42–43. Note that this proposal also
includes amending 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 to allow asylum officers to grant withholding of
removal protection. Id. at 47–50.
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constitute an additional burden on the asylum office,216 but would
advance the goal of reducing the immigration court backlog. Finally,
allocating heavier responsibility to the asylum office, rather than the
courts, would make sense from a budgetary perspective, as funding an
asylum officer costs far less than funding a judge, a trial attorney, court
personnel, and the interpreters required for adjudication of asylum
claims in court.217
C. Reforms to Specifically Address the Interplay of the One-Year Bar
and the Backlog
Assuming that Congress does not repeal the one-year deadline to
apply for asylum and that the backlog of cases in immigration court
persists, the DHS, EOIR, USCIS, ICE Office of Chief Counsel, and
attorneys representing asylum seekers should take the following steps to
prevent disastrous consequences for asylum seekers caught up in the
procedural nightmare caused by the deadline and backlog combined.
1. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
a. Expand the List of Extraordinary Circumstances
DHS should immediately initiate the process to amend its
regulations to expand the list of enumerated “extraordinary
circumstances.”218 As discussed earlier in this Article,219 although it is
216. The Asylum Division is stretched very thin at present due to their mandate
to conduct credible and reasonable fear interviews at the southern border for the
increased numbers of asylum seekers, primarily from Central America, but has been
able to double their corps of asylum officers in an attempt meet this challenge in the last
few years, showing some promise of flexibility and efficiency in hiring to meet this
challenge if needed. Indeed, adjudication of the asylum claim by the Asylum Office,
under this proposal, may still be significantly delayed. The recently created Asylum
Scheduling Bulletin reveals that some of the eight asylum offices nationwide are
scheduling interviews more than four-and-a-half years after the filing of the asylum
application. See Affirmative Asylum Scheduling Bulletin, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION
SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugeesasylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-scheduling-bulletin [https://perma.cc/HYE6-YWJZ]
(last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
217. Note that an asylum applicant is responsible for bringing her own
interpreter, if needed, to an asylum interview with an asylum officer, whereas
interpreters are provided at government expense in immigration court. See
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.11 (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2016); see also
INFORMATIONAL GUIDE FOR PROSPECTIVE ASYLUM APPLICANTS, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS. (2012).
218. Schrag et al., supra note 30, at 766 (suggesting including the list of other
possible extraordinary circumstances outlined in the Asylum Office Basic Training
Course, discussed in supra note 33, but also to include additional circumstances:
“unawareness of the existence of the right to seek asylum; unawareness of the time
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clear by regulation that the listed extraordinary circumstances are not
exhaustive, judges routinely fail to properly adjudicate even the listed
exceptions.220
b. Include a Limited Exception to the Deadline for Those Without
Notice
In Matter of Y-C-,221 the BIA established a three-part test to
determine whether an applicant’s failure to file within one year of
arrival was due to an extraordinary circumstance:222 first, the applicant
must establish the existence of extraordinary circumstance; second, the
applicant must show that those circumstances directly relate to her
failure to timely file for asylum; third, the applicant must prove that the
delayed filing was reasonable under the circumstances.223
In cases adjudicated prior to the September 2016 policy change in
which an asylum seeker did not file her application in a timely manner,
advocates could make a straightforward argument that she had no actual
opportunity to file where their court date was set out beyond one year
after their arrival. Logically, where the deadline was missed, attorneys
argued that the failure of EOIR to provide a hearing date prior to one
year constitutes an extraordinary circumstances exception to the
deadline. Under the Matter of Y-C- framework, attorneys could argue
that the extraordinary circumstance existed, that the lack of a court date
directly delayed the filing, and that delayed filing was reasonable under
the circumstances. While many judges seemed to accept this argument
without objection,224 some judges completely dismissed the notion that
limit on applications; detention within the United States; fear that efforts to obtain the
corroborating evidence necessary for a successful asylum application will endanger
family members in the applicant’s home country; victimization by a person other than
an attorney, including a person pretending to be an attorney, who purported to be
helping the applicant file an application; and inability, despite genuine and timely
effort, to obtain a representative who could help compile the supporting evidence and
file the application”); see also HEARTLAND ALLIANCE ET AL., supra note 42, at 11;
Pistone & Schrag, supra note 197, at 33–34, 37 (suggesting additional examples of
extraordinary circumstances be added to regulations, including the lack of awareness of
the United States’ asylum law or the deadline and an inability to obtain legal counsel);
Philip G. Schrag & Michele R. Pistone, The New Asylum Rule: Not Yet a Model of Fair
Procedure, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 267, 276 (1997) (“The INS should also include, in its
illustrative list of changed circumstances, a genuinely belated discovery by the applicant
of the existence of the U.S. asylum system or the application deadline.”).
219. See supra Part III.B.2.
220. The enumerated extraordinary circumstance exceptions to the one-year
filing deadline for DHS are currently found at 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(i)-(iv) (2016).
221. 23 I. & N. Dec. 286, 288 (B.I.A. 2002).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Complaint, supra note 136, at 19–20.
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the administrative scheduling delays caused by the immigration court
backlog could be an extraordinary circumstance exception to the oneyear deadline. Indeed, in Liana and Yesenia’s cases discussed in Part
III, the judges rejected these arguments wholesale, incorrectly
understanding them to be the respondents’ own “ignorance” of the law.
It is notable, however, that the BIA found in Liana’s case that the
inability to file within a year due to a lack of scheduled court hearing
was an extraordinary circumstance beyond Liana’s control that excused
the untimely filing of her asylum application.225
The expanded list of extraordinary circumstances, thus, should not
only include the additional list of extraordinary circumstances included
in USCIS Asylum Office training materials,226 but also include a limited
exception for individuals who lack notice of the requirement to file
within one year of arrival in the United States. To be clear, this
exception should apply where
1) the asylum seeker lacks notice of the filing deadline;227
2) the NTA was issued and filed with the immigration court
before the one-year filing deadline;228 and
3) the initial master calendar hearing was set for a date after
the one-year filing deadline.
Failure to provide instruction to immigration judges on this issue
will result in unfairness, as evidenced in Liana and Yesenia’s cases,
where an individual judge can bar asylum based on an unwillingness to
consider an extraordinary circumstances argument.
This fix would be in line with congressional intent in enacting the
one-year deadline in the first place. Indeed, one legislator involved in
the passage of the one-year deadline clearly expressed his belief that
asylum seekers would be clearly informed of the deadline to apply.229

225. See supra note 161.
226. These were mentioned in Part II of this Article. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
227. This lack of notice should apply regardless of whether or not the asylum
seeker underwent a credible fear interview—if she expressed a fear of return to her
home country and was released from detention with a Notice to Appear in immigration
court—she should be deemed an asylum seeker entitled to notice of the deadline. See
Complaint, supra note 136, at 11–13 (detailing “other entrants” as those asylum
seekers who were not referred for a credible fear interview upon arrival in the United
State and were instead “paroled” from detention with a NTA referring them directly to
removal proceedings).
228. There are often delays where ICE does not file the NTA with the
immigration court for months, or even more than a year. See Complaint, supra note
136, at 3.
229. Khandwala et al., supra note 29, at 5 (“[T]he chief House sponsor of the
deadline, Rep. Bill McCollum, stated: ‘The Immigration Service would be required to
tell people who came in that they could apply for asylum and this is how long it would
take. Well it may not be in the legislation but it's certainly going to be in the report
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Despite this, it has never been agency practice under the former INS,
or under any branch of the current DHS, to inform asylum seekers of
their duty to apply for asylum within one year of arrival. The failure to
inform should be remedied, as discussed below, but the consequences
of that failure should be ameliorated by giving immigration judges clear
power and instruction to consider a lack of notice, and therefore
knowledge, of the requirement to file as an extraordinary circumstances
exception to the one-year deadline. It is simply untenable for the United
States government to continue its absolute failure to advise asylum
seekers of their responsibility to file within one year of arrival and then
to later penalize them for their lack of knowledge of the precise
workings of the complex asylum adjudication system.
2. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
a. Mandate a One-Year Bar Advisal for Asylum Seekers with Positive
Credible Fear Determinations
USCIS should issue advisals to all individuals who pass credible
fear interviews, making it abundantly clear the steps that the individual
must undertake to actually file an application for asylum and to do so
within one year after the asylum seeker’s last arrival into the United
States. The Author has led efforts with advocates to draft such advisals,
which were delivered to the asylum office in April 2016.230 Advocates
recommended that these advisals be provided in both oral and written
form, in the asylum seeker’s primary language. Among other
information, the advisals would make clear that the asylum seeker must
take additional steps to file for asylum and would make clear to the
asylum seeker precisely how and where to go about filing.231
language and I think the Immigration Service is going to do that.’ Unfortunately, the
Committee Report did not include such language, and the INS did not adopt the policy
of informing potential asylum seekers of the deadline.”).
230. At the November 4, 2016 USCIS Asylum Division Quarterly Stakeholders
Meeting, USCIS declined to comment on the status of the advisals given the pending
Mendez-Rojas litigation. Formal meeting notes have not yet been issued but informal
notes, taken by American Immigration Lawyers Association National Asylum and
Refugee Liaison Committee Co-Chair, Sandra Grossman, are on file with the author.
231. To actually facilitate pro se filings at the court window prior to the
deadline, USCIS, the creator and keeper of the I-589 application for asylum, should
make the form available in other languages, and EOIR should amend the Immigration
Court Practice Manual to accept these foreign language forms. The asylum office
already makes certain materials available in other languages—for example an asylum
seeker is able to receive her asylum approval letter in one of the ten most common
languages spoken by asylum seekers. Providing the form itself in the relevant languages
would assist in the expeditious completion and filing of the asylum application,
regardless of whether legal counsel or competent interpretation can be accessed and
retained within one year after arrival. Of course there are costs involved with issuing
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To its credit, EOIR is the first agency to take any steps to attempt
to remedy the unfair and troubling consequences of the one-year filing
deadline and the immigration court backlog combined. But to offer a
meaningful solution, the agency’s September 14, 2016 policy
announcement must be just the first in a constellation of reforms to
address this issue. Without further reform, the policy change actually
works to further disadvantage pro se asylum seekers. Recognizing
asylum applications filed at the court window as filed for the purposes
of the deadline advantages only those asylum seekers who know about
this new rule. Given the lack of notice given to asylum seekers on the
one-year deadline and the mechanics of filing, asylum seekers
represented by competent counsel are far more likely to file an
application at the court window. Pro se individuals remain unlikely to
file and to understand that there is anything they must do to initiate
their asylum claim other than wait for their court date, which may be
scheduled years into the future.
Prior to the bright-line rule recognizing window-filing as filing for
one-year purposes, many judges exercised discretion in finding an
extraordinary circumstances exception to the deadline, which benefitted
pro se and represented individuals who missed the deadline due to no
fault of their own when a hearing was not timely scheduled. Now that
the hearing is not the only time that an asylum seeker can file, judges
may hesitate to exercise that same discretion to find an extraordinary
circumstance to excuse untimely filing exists.

and accepting the I-589 form in multiple languages, so the cost of such a fix should be
considered when weighed against larger rule changes, such as adjudicating credible fear
claims as full asylum claims in the first instance.
Although the ramifications of accepting filings in different languages without
translations are potentially complex, language should not be a barrier to an individual
timely filing an application. Further, rules could be implemented to simplify the
logistical challenges and financial burden on the court—for example, requiring a
translation to be submitted prior to the merits hearing on the asylum claim in order for
the claim to be adjudicated. But, the cost of even just initially accepting the form in
multiple languages may be prohibitive given that judges would likely wish to verify that
there was a possibility of eligibility for asylum prior to scheduling a merits hearing.
And so, translation on the part of the court may be required (the burden of written
translation is usually on the asylum seeker and all respondents in immigration court, see
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 3.3a (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2016)) and may
be expensive or logistically challenging. Therefore, the relatively costless solutions
outlined within this Part of the Article—ensuring asylum seekers receive notice and
issuing instructions to immigration judges on administrative delays caused by the
backlog as an extraordinary circumstances exception to the one-year deadline—should
be the high priority solutions EOIR and USCIS implement to address this eminently
solvable problem.
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Prior to the September 14, 2016 policy change, courts and judges
across the nation varied as to how they handled the interplay between
the asylum one-year filing deadline and the immigration court backlog,
as well as how they approach lodging, filing, motions to advance,
extraordinary circumstance exception arguments, and other legal
arguments on this issue.232 EOIR has refused to disclose detailed
information regarding how these issues are addressed nationwide.233
Anecdotally, however, and from the information gathered to support
the Mendez Rojas class action lawsuit, it is clear that immigration
courts—and indeed, individual judges—across the nation varied greatly
in terms of their approach to the interplay between the one-year
deadline and the immigration court backlog.234 The result, of course,
was a further extension of the phenomenon coined by Professors RamjiNogales, Schrag, and Schoenholtz as “refugee roulette”235—the
inconsistent adjudication of asylum claims nationwide. In one
courtroom, an individual who missed the deadline due to a lack of
opportunity to file in court before the deadline was found to be asylum
eligible and deadline excused, while in another, she is barred from
asylum.
Given the lack of detailed guidance on the implementation of the
September 14, 2016 policy change and how it applies to individuals
who already missed the deadline, whether or not they “lodged” or did
not lodge at the court window, the risk of “refugee roulette” remains.236
232. Complaint, supra note 136, at 19–20.
233. In an effort to understand the breadth of this problem, the Author
developed a short survey to administer with the court administrators at all fifty-seven
immigration courts, throughout the nation. Unfortunately, however, EOIR’s Public
Affairs office made it clear that court administrators would not respond to these basic
questions (which included simply whether their court had any cases scheduled for
master calendar hearings beyond the one-year deadline) because of pending litigation.
Absent clarification, which the Author requested, from EOIR, the Author can only
assume that this pending litigation must refer the Mendez Rojas lawsuit, discussed
above, which challenges the government’s failure to advise asylum seekers of the oneyear deadline and to provide a meaningful opportunity to file the application within that
one-year period. See E-mail from Kathryn Mattingly, Assistant Press Secretary in
EOIR’s Office of Communications and Legislative Affairs, to author (July 27, 2016,
5:04 PM) (on file with author) (“This matter is currently under litigation so we cannot
participate.”).
234.
Complaint, supra note 136, at 3.
235. JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2009).
236. The memorandum does not make clear, for example, whether an
individual who lodged their asylum application at the court window prior to the
September 14, 2016 policy announcement permitting filing at the window, would then
be considered to have filed, or whether they would still be barred from asylum
eligibility and bear the burden of proving an exception to the one-year filing deadline
was warranted by their individual circumstances. Memorandum from Michael C.
McGoings, supra note 7.
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The disparities in how the one-year filing deadline applies, however,
will largely be along the lines of represented versus unrepresented
individuals, those who were informed about the deadline—thanks to
securing competent legal counsel—and those who remained in the dark.
a. Provide Advisals Following Positive Credible Fear Interviews and at
the First Scheduled Master Calendar Hearing
To properly effectuate reform, EOIR must first, like USCIS, issue
advisals to individuals who receive a positive credible fear
determination. Where the asylum division issues a negative decision
following a credible fear interview, the asylum seeker has the
opportunity to go before an immigration judge for a review of that
decision.237 In the event that the immigration judge vacates the asylum
officer’s negative determination and issues a positive decision, the
immigration judge should be responsible for advising the asylum
seeker, orally and in writing, as to the requirement to file for asylum
within one year of arrival in the United States and precisely how to go
about doing so.
Further, where an asylum case is not affected by the immigration
court backlog and an asylum seeker appears at a master calendar
hearing scheduled before her one-year deadline, the immigration judge
likewise has a duty to advise an asylum seeker of the one-year
deadline.238 Under the existing regulations, the immigration judge
should make clear, to any individual who has expressed a fear to United
States immigration officials or undergone a credible fear interview, that
she must file an I-589 Application for Asylum at the court window or in
court within one year after her arrival in the United States. Ensuring
conformity with these required advisals can be achieved through a
memo from the Chief Immigration Judge, advising immigration judges
of their affirmative duty to notify asylum seekers who meet the credible
fear standard of the one-year deadline and how to file.

237. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012); 8
C.F.R. § 208.30(g)(2) (2016).
238. This comports with an immigration judge’s duty to inform noncitizens in
removal proceedings of their “apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits
enumerated in this chapter.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2016). Under 8 C.F.R. §
1240.11(c)(1), where a noncitizen expresses a fear of persecution (which any asylum
seeker would have done if they have undergone a credible fear interview), then the
judge must, under (c)(1)(i), “[a]dvise the alien that he or she may apply for asylum,”
and under (ii) “[m]ake available the appropriate application forms.”
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b. Implement a Limited Exception for Lack of Notice and Expand
Exceptions to the One-Year Deadline
As discussed above with regards to DHS, EOIR must also expand
the list of circumstances qualifying as exceptions to the filing deadline
further239 to include individuals who can demonstrate that they lacked
notice, and thus knowledge of the deadline.240 Although it is clear under
the regulations that the list of extraordinary circumstances exceptions to
the one-year deadline is non-exhaustive, some immigration judges have
been reluctant to find that an administrative delay in scheduling a
master calendar hearing—to permit an individual to timely file for an
asylum—constitutes an extraordinary circumstance. Examples of this
intransigence and the resulting bar to protection for asylum seekers
were discussed earlier in this Article with the cases of Yesenia and
Liana. These same judges will likely find that any asylum seeker who
failed to file her asylum application at the window, following the
September 14, 2016 announcement, has missed the filing deadline and
that failure to file cannot be excused, even if she lacked any notice of
the requirement to file within a year.
Because rulemaking is a time-consuming process, in the meantime,
there are two ways that EOIR can provide the guidance needed to
immigration judges on this issue. First, the BIA recently issued an
unpublished decision, discussed above, as “Liana’s case.”241 In that
decision, the BIA made clear that a failure to meet the filing deadline
because a master calendar was scheduled beyond the one-year filing
deadline met the extraordinary circumstances “test” under INA §
208(A)(2)(D). The BIA should designate this decision as a precedent
decision to provide this guidance to immigration judges nationwide.
A second critically important and long-overdue step is for the
EOIR or the Office of Chief Immigration Judge to issue instructions for
immigration judges on this issue. Given the volume of cases currently
being adjudicated, the agency cannot wait for the rulemaking process to
239. Advocates have long recommended that EOIR adopt the USCIS Asylum
Office’s training materials and expanded list of extraordinary circumstances to be
considered as exceptions to the one-year deadline. HEARTLAND ALLIANCE ET AL., supra
note 42, at 10 (“DOJ should immediately adopt Asylum Office guidance that lists
additional circumstances that can constitute statutory exceptions to the deadline, beyond
those listed in the regulations.”).
240. The current regulations on extraordinary circumstance exceptions to the
one-year deadline are found at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5)(i)–(vi) (2016). The proposed
exception discussed above, supra Part IV.C.1.a, for DHS, should also be added to the
regulations for EOIR. HEARTLAND ALLIANCE ET AL., supra note 42, at 11 (“DOJ and
DHS should give particular consideration to whether individuals who were reasonably
unaware of potential eligibility for asylum protection can demonstrate an exception to
the deadline.”).
241. See supra note 161.
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conclude. These instructions should make absolutely clear that a failure
to meet the one-year deadline because an individual lacked notice of the
requirement to file and her first court date was set beyond the deadline,
qualifies as an extraordinary circumstances exception to the deadline.242
EOIR should also make clear that where an individual has undergone a
credible fear interview, or expressed her fear to a United States
immigration official,243 her application for asylum should be deemed
“filed” for the purposes of the one-year deadline.
It is difficult to understand why it took EOIR so long to take any
action to protect asylum seekers from the rejection of their asylum
applications based on a technicality in scheduling and filing beyond
their control. Now, however, the agency has taken action that is
incomplete and may actually exacerbate the inequities in the system.
Previously, judges could find extraordinary circumstances exceptions
for individuals who failed to meet the one-year deadline due to a lack of
a scheduled master hearing and thus no opportunity to file. Now,
individuals technically have an opportunity to file because filing at the
window before the one-year deadline counts. This opportunity is not,
242. Efforts in the past year or so to push EOIR to issue such guidance have
been unsuccessful. These efforts included a formal letter drafted by Akin Gump Strauss
Hauer & Feld, LLP, and Human Rights First, urging EOIR action to remedy the
problem of the deadline combined with the backlog (on file with author). The Author
was present at meetings with the White House Office of Public Engagement between
July 2015 and June 2016 during which Nathan Berkeley, a spokesperson for EOIR
made it very clear that the agency was unwilling to issue any guidance for immigration
judges on the matter of the filing deadline and the immigration court backlog. This has
been superseded, somewhat, by the September 14, 2016 memo from the Acting Chief
Immigration Judge. Memorandum from Michael C. McGoings, supra note 7. American
Immigration Lawyers Association’s EOIR liaison committee also raised these issues
with EOIR and received the following response:
EOIR does not intend to issue additional guidance at this time regarding the
effect of timely lodging an asylum application on the one-year filing
deadline for such applications. The guidance with respect to this issue,
provided on page 6 of OPPM 13-03, clearly states, ‘Legal determinations
regarding the effect of lodging an asylum application are within the
province of the presiding Immigration Judge. For example, judges may
consider the legal effect of lodging an asylum application when considering
whether an exception to the one-year bar applies.’ In cases where an asylum
application is untimely filed, judges decide whether the ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ exception to the filing deadline applies on a case-by-case
basis.
Meeting Agenda and Unofficial Notes for USCIS Asylum Division, supra note 129.
243. Not all individuals who express a fear when apprehended by Customs and
Border Protection or when arriving at the border actually receive a credible fear
interview. In fact, many are released on parole into the United States simply with a
Notice to Appear in immigration court to pursue their claims for relief, including
asylum. Revised Parole Policy for Arriving Aliens with Credible Fear Claims,
U.S.
IMMIGRATION
&
CUSTOMS
ENF’T
(Dec.
16,
2009),
https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/credible-fear [https://perma.cc/9PMJ-FSGA].
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however, helpful for asylum seekers nationwide who lack competent
representation.
EOIR may be resistant to giving immigration judges instructions as
to how to rule on extraordinary circumstance exceptions to the filing
deadline. In meetings with advocates, EOIR previously asserted that it
did not want to interfere with an individual immigration judge’s
discretion to determine whether filing late because of a lack of a
hearing before the one-year deadline constituted an extraordinary
circumstance to excuse late filing.244 While a judge’s discretion is no
doubt important and deserves deference in many contexts, this is not
one of them. An overwhelmed and overburdened agency unable to
provide hearings in a timely manner to enable pro se asylum seekers to
meet their filing obligation cannot ethically penalize asylum seekers for
their failure to somehow discern that they must file an official
application for asylum within a year. EOIR should, of course, protect
immigration judge discretion when it comes to the substance of an
asylum claim, the credibility of an individual asylum applicant before
the judge, and other important determinations that vary between cases.
It is in EOIR’s own self-interest, however, to create a uniform,
efficient, and fair system for the adjudication of missed one-year filing
deadlines for as long as the lack of notice to asylum seekers and the
backlog persists. The only way to do so is to create uniform rules for
immigration judges to follow, which include a lack of notice as an
extraordinary circumstance exception to the one-year deadline.
c. Provide Maximum Due Process for Unrepresented Asylum Seekers
Absent clear instruction from the Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge, individual immigration judges should exercise their discretion in
favor of ensuring access to justice for pro se asylum seekers. The
Immigration Court Practice Manual itself encourages immigrants
appearing in immigration court to retain an attorney.245 Section 2.2(a)
of the manual states, “Due to the complexity of the immigration and
nationality laws, the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge
recommends that those who can obtain qualified professional
representation do so.”246 Section 2.2(b) explains that judges are
obligated to provide a list of pro bono legal service providers to
respondents appearing without counsel.247 Where an asylum seeker has

244. IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 3.1(b)(iii) (U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE 2016).
245. Id. § 2.2(b).
246. Id. § 2.2(a)
247. Id. § 2.2(b). In addition, the government is always represented by a
trained prosecutor in immigration court. Id. § 1.2(h). As Professor Engler explains,
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not been able to secure counsel prior to the one-year filing deadline,
then immigration judges must adjust their behavior accordingly.248
While recommendations could be made that court staff—including the
court administrator, filing clerks, and law clerks—become involved in
disseminating information and guidance to pro se asylum seekers, this
line of thinking is impractical, as generally asylum seekers have no
reason to come to the court location if their hearing date is not
scheduled until further into the future, beyond their one-year filing
deadline. Such assistance, thus, would be futile. Therefore, without
proper notice of the filing requirement, accommodations must be made
on the back-end, once the deadline has already been missed, to protect
the rights of pro se asylum seekers.
Much of the access to justice literature argues that judges
presented with pro se litigants have a responsibility to engage in “active
judging,” which can be broken down into three main categories: (1)
adjusting procedures; (2) explaining law and the legal process;249 and
(3) eliciting information.250 In this circumstance, active judging means
adjusting procedures and finding that where an individual has expressed
their intent to apply for asylum—often actually explained their fear of
return to an asylum officer—yet failed to submit an official form
applying for asylum to the court window before one year, that

“[c]ases involving a represented party against an unrepresented one presented the
greatest challenge to maintaining impartiality.” Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition:
Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 367, 372 (2008).
248. See Engler, supra note 247, at 372–74 (explaining that, generally, courts
must take into account the needs of self-represented litigants).
249. Immigration judges are required to advise noncitizens of their rights in
proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a) (2016).
250. Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice 7 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). Immigration judges already have some duty to engage
in active judging through their duty to develop the record under INA § 240(b)(1),
which requires immigration judges to “administer oaths, receive evidence, and
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.” INA §
240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2012). The regulations further reinforce this and
also require immigration judges to take other actions that are “appropriate and
necessary for the disposition” of an individual case. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2016).
The Board of Immigration Appeals has further reinforced these duties through
case law. See Matter of E-F-H-L-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323–24 (B.I.A. 2014) (finding
that the regulations require a full hearing on the merits to adjudicate an asylum claim
and this duty is reinforced by the judge’s statutory duty to develop the record); Matter
of J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 922 (Att’y Gen. May 1, 2006) (“It is appropriate for
Immigration Judges to aid in the development of the record, and directly question
witnesses, particularly where an alien appears pro se and may be unschooled in the
deportation process . . . .”).
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individual should be deemed to have met the technical requirement of
“filing” for asylum for the purposes of the one-year deadline.251
4. ICE ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to put individuals into
removal proceedings in the first place is discussed above as one way in
which the immigration court backlog could be reduced. In a separate
but similarly important manifestation of prosecutorial discretion, where
an asylum case is before the court, ICE trial counsel should exercise the
power to stipulate to asylum where it is clear that an individual clearly
meets the definition of a refugee but has simply missed the deadline due
to the lack of an opportunity to timely file for asylum in open court.
Trial counsel could also stipulate just to the discrete issue that the
asylum application was timely filed or that an exception has been met,
particularly in situations where the asylum applicant expressed their
fear to the United States government prior to the one-year deadline.
This would comport with an ICE attorney’s duty to faithfully uphold
American laws, which includes ensuring that no individual is returned
to a country where she would face a threat to her life or freedom, or,
indeed a well-founded fear of persecution.

251. CYNTHIA GRAY, AM. JUDICATURE SOC., REACHING OUT OR
OVERREACHING: JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 1, 5 (2005),
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/ReachingOutOverreaching.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZQ5S-P849] (“A judge should take pains to protect self-represented
litigants against the consequences of technical errors” and “[U]nder the code of judicial
conduct, no reasonable question is raised about a judge’s impartiality when the judge,
in an exercise of discretion, makes procedural accommodations that will provide a
diligent self-represented litigant acting in good faith the opportunity to have his or her
case fairly heard — and, therefore, that a judge should do so.”).
But see Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving SelfRepresenting Litigants, 42 JUDGES J. 16, 44 (2003) (synthesizing the guidance from
cases on the role of a judge in adjudicating cases involving pro se litigants, including,
as one of six basis propositions: “The hard procedural bars—pertaining to statutes of
limitation, availability of administrative remedies, and time limits for filing an appeal—
apply equally to represented and unrepresented litigants. Some of the cases do not
support this principle, but the majority do. These procedural bars are fundamental rules
governing the legal process. For the most part, appellate courts are uncomfortable
applying them differently to different parties for any reason—and particularly not
because they are or are not represented by counsel.”).
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5. IMMIGRATION ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES:

a. Argue that Undergoing a Credible Fear Interview Constitutes Filing
for Asylum
In the absence of further reform by EOIR or USCIS, which seems
incredibly unlikely in light of the election of Donald Trump, whose
campaign was in part fueled by anti-immigrant rhetoric and vitriol,
attorneys must now, more than ever, continue to zealously advocate for
asylum seekers affected by the one-year filing deadline and the
immigration court backlog.
Specifically, attorneys must continue to argue interpretations of the
statutes and regulations, as Yesenia’s attorney did, that an individual
who has undergone a credible fear interview has essentially applied for
asylum. INA § 208(1)(a) provides that an application for asylum can be
made “in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section
235(b) of this title.”252 The one-year deadline, codified under INA §
208(a)(2)(B), provides that absent extraordinary or changed
circumstances exceptions, § 208(1) shall not apply unless the
application for asylum is made within one year of the applicant’s arrival
in the United States.253 The expedited removal provisions of the statute,
codified under INA § 235(b), state that when an inadmissible alien
seeking admission “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum
under section 208 of this title or a fear of persecution, the officer shall
refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer under
subparagraph (B).”254 INA § 235(b) provides the process for asylum
officer consideration and review of the credible fear interview and no
application form is mentioned or required in that process.255 Therefore,
once an individual states that she is afraid to return to her country of
origin, she should be deemed an applicant for asylum.
The argument has been made that under the plain language of the
statute, a request for or referral to a credible fear interview under INA
§ 235(b), made within the first year after entry, constitutes an
application for asylum.256 As such, any individual who has undergone
or even simply requested a credible fear interview has met the one-year
deadline. While this argument has merit, the immigration judge and the
BIA in Yesenia’s case discussed in Part III, squarely rejected this
reasoning,257 and the argument has yet to be ruled upon in any

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
Id. § 208(a)(2)(B).
INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
Id. § 235(b).
Yesenia IJ Decision, supra note 163, at 13–16.
Id. at 18.
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precedential decision nationwide. Unless and until the backlog
disappears, the one-year deadline is eviscerated, or DOJ and DHS issue
regulations clearly recognizing an extraordinary circumstances
exception for a lack of notice and knowledge of the deadline, attorneys
must continue to engage in aggressive advocacy for clients who missed
the deadline due to a lack of notice and any meaningful opportunity to
file.
b. Increase Legal Representation of Asylum Seekers
Prior to the immigration court backlog, attorneys helped to ensure
that an individual met the one-year deadline by timely filing their
asylum applications with the asylum office or in immigration court. In
the era of the immigration backlog, combined with the rule requiring
in-court filings, attorneys engaged in the technical and cumbersome
steps in an effort to preserve asylum eligibility and prove attempts to
timely file. The September 14, 2016 EOIR announcement is welcome
news for immigration attorneys, who can now simply file their client’s
application with the court window to both start the clock for
employment authorization purposes and to meet the one-year deadline.
Indeed, attorneys may be the group who benefit most from the recent
policy change. Hopefully, attorneys will now be freed up to take on
additional representation as they will no longer expend the same amount
of time and resources simply acting to preserve asylum eligibility.
Increased legal representation in asylum cases may also help to
alleviate the immigration court backlog by increasing court
efficiency.258 A recent nationwide study of access to counsel in
258. The National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) has made clear
that representation increases efficiency in immigration court. In a letter to Senate
majority leader, Harry Reid, and Senate minority leader, Mitch McConnell, the NAIJ
explained:
It is our experience that when noncitizens are represented by attorneys,
Immigration Judges are able to conduct proceedings more expeditiously and
resolve cases more quickly. Judges have found that cases with legal
representation generally 1) reduce the number and length of proceedings for
benefits for which individuals are ineligible; 2) generally require fewer
continuances for preparation (including when applications must be
processed by other agencies); 3) obviate appeals based on lack of
understanding of legal rights or concerns about fairness; 4) take less hearing
time for judges because they are better researched and organized; and 5)
tend to reduce the number of futile claims which utterly lack a basis in law.
See Letter from Dana Leigh Marks, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges, to
Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate and Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader,
U.S. Senate on Special Concerns Relating to Juveniles in Immigration Court (July 22,
2014),
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/NAIJ_Senate_Ltr_ens
uring_fairness_to_juveniles_2014_07_22.pdf [https://perma.cc/88NC-DCTR]; see also
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immigration court concluded that having counsel increases immigration
court efficiency,259 along with the rates of release for detained
individuals260 and appearance rates following release.261 Indeed, recently
a spokesperson for the Executive Office of Immigration Review itself
stated, “[i]n general, legal representation enhances the effectiveness and
efficiency of immigration proceedings.”262

Srikantiah et al., supra note 122, at 210 (citing Letter from Hon. Dana Leigh Marks,
President, Nat’l Assoc. of Immigration Judges (Mar. 22, 2013)).
259. DONALD KERWIN, REVISITING THE NEED FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL,
MIGRATION POL. INST. 1 (2005), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/revisitingneed-appointed-counsel [https://perma.cc/SHV9-ETV3] (“Legal representation benefits
immigrants, but it also serves the government’s interest by promoting better-prepared
cases, more efficient proceedings, shorter detention periods, and correct legal
decisions.”); M. Margaret McKeown & Allegra McLeod, The Counsel Conundrum:
Effective Representation in Immigration Proceedings, in REFUGEE ROULETTE:
DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM, 286, 289 (Jaya
Ramji-Nogales et al. eds., 2009) (“At every stage of immigration proceedings, as in
other areas of litigation and adjudication, the presence of competent counsel improves
the efficiency of case processing and the administration of justice.”); Eagly & Shafer,
supra note 113, at 5 (citing Lucas Guttentag & Ahilan Arulanantham, Extending the
Promise of Gideon: Immigration, Deportation, and the Right to Counsel, 39 HUM. RTS.
14, 16 (2013) (“Advocates have also shown that speedy appointment of counsel can
save substantial detention costs if detained immigrants have qualified lawyers to
promptly assess their claims.”)).
260. AM. BAR ASS’N, ENSURING FAIRNESS AND DUE PROCESS
IN
IMMIGRATION
PROCEEDINGS
2
(2008),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/immigration/2
008dec_immigration.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3GA-7PY9]
(“[L]egal
representation also benefits the government and the administration of justice through . .
. fewer requests for continuances and shorter periods in detention at significant
financial savings.”); NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR, BLAZING A TRAIL: THE FIGHT FOR
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN DETENTION AND BEYOND 9–11 (2016), https://www.nilc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Right-to-Counsel-Blazing-a-Trail-2016-03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6Y3Y-PG47] (citing U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, COST SAVINGS
ANALYSIS - THE EOIR LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM 2
(2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/03/14/LOP_Cost_Savings_
Analysis_4-04-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDR9-4FNN]); Eagly & Shafer, supra note
113, at 69–72;
261. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 260, at 2 (“[L]egal representation also
benefits the government and the administration of justice through improved appearance
rates in court . . . .”); Eagly & Shafer, supra note 113, at 2, 59–75; see also Srikantiah
et al., supra note 122, at 226, 230 (reporting that detained immigrants in removal
proceedings in Northern California were able to obtain bond seventy-one percent of the
time when represented by attorneys working for area non-profit organizations. The
study also reported that where non-profit attorneys represented detained immigrants,
they received immigration relief allowing them to remain in the United States thirtythree percent of the time, a striking statistic compared with only eleven percent success
in remaining in the United States for unrepresented detained individuals).
262. Fernanda Santos, It’s Children Against Federal Lawyers in Immigration
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/inimmigration-court-children-must-serve-as-their-own-
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Scholars and advocates have also suggested that appointing
government-funded counsel to asylum seekers would be “fair to lowincome asylum applicants with complex but valid cases” and “help to
deter fraudulent applicants from pressing their claims.”263 Calls for
government-funded appointed counsel for immigrants in removal
proceedings, and more specifically asylum seekers, have made their
way into recent proposed legislation.264 Advocates are also pushing
through class action litigation for guaranteed legal representation for
some of the most vulnerable groups, including children265 and mentally
incompetent immigrants266 in removal proceedings.
Until the government funds appointed counsel for all asylum
seekers—or, in the very least, a subset of the most vulnerable asylum
seekers—attorneys should individually aim to take on pro bono
representation of asylum seekers and to encourage their networks and
peers to do the same.267

lawyers.html?mwrsm=Email&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/UT5D-469M]) (quoting EOIR
Spokesperson Kathryn Mattingly).
263. Philip G. Schrag, Offer Free Legal Counseling to Asylum
Seekers,
N.Y.
Times
(July
12,
2011,
11:10
PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/12/how-can-the-asylum-system-befixed/offer-free-legal-counseling-to-asylum-seekers
[https://perma.cc/CLY6-MCA8];
see also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 260, at 2 (stating that legal representation deters
frivolous claims); Bill Frelick, Room for Debate: The Right to
Representation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
12,
2012,
11:10
PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/12/how-can-the-asylum-system-befixed/asylum-seekers-the-right-to-representation
[https://perma.cc/T9PK-GTMT]
(arguing that giving asylum seekers the right to funded appointed counsel would
undermine fraud and also stop asylum fraud from “costing the government by clogging
the system with erroneous decisions and inefficiencies”).
264. Recently, for example, Senator Harry Reid proposed the Fair Day in
Court for Kids Act of 2016, which would provide counsel for immigrant children in
proceedings. S. 2540 114th Cong. (2016). The Refugee Protection Act of 2016, S.
3241, 114th Cong. (2016), and the Senate Border Security, Economic Opportunity and
Immigration Modernization (SBEOIM) Act of 2013, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013), make
similar proposals. Section 3502 of SBEOIM focused on “improving immigration court
efficiency and reducing costs by increasing access to legal information,” including
appointing counsel to unaccompanied children, individuals with serious mental
disabilities, and “other particularly vulnerable immigrants” in immigration court if
counsel is “necessary to help ensure fair resolution and efficient adjudication of the
proceedings” and allowing immigration judges to appoint government funded counsel in
other instances at her discretion. Id.
265. See J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 983 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016) (certifying the
class of asylum-seeking children in the Ninth Circuit).
266. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBX), 2013
WL 3674492, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (ordering that EOIR and DHS must
provide mentally incompetent immigrants unable to represent themselves in California,
Washington, and Arizona with legal counsel in removal proceedings).
267. Following the results of the November 2016 Presidential election,
inducing fear and heartbreak in immigrant communities, there has been an outpouring
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One consideration in arguing in favor of increased legal
representation for asylum seekers is, of course, that the simple fact of
representation does not ensure high-quality, competent representation.
Indeed, the New York Immigrant Representation Study conducted an
anonymous survey of New York immigration judges and made clear
that private practitioners—who provide ninety-one percent of all
immigration representation—were rated significantly lower than other
categories of providers, including law school clinics, pro bono counsel,
and nonprofit organizations.268 Indeed, immigration judges surveyed
reported that “[n]early half of all representatives are not prepared and
lack even adequate knowledge of the law or facts of a particular
respondent’s case.”269 While concerns over the general competence and
quality of the immigration bar overall are not new, new data regarding
this problem has been recently published suggesting that inadequate
representation is exceedingly common.270 Concerns about the quality of
representation, however, do not justify failing to provide or attempt to
provide representation.271 Rather, the prevalence of substandard
representation should be a call to action for funders and specialists alike

of support in the legal community, including a spoken willingness from attorneys of all
areas of specialization to train and undertake pro bono representation of immigrants in
need. One can only hope that these words and sentiments propel like-minded concrete
action.
268. Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report,
supra note 122, at 389.
269. Id.
270. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 113, at 8 (questioning how complete
attorney representation in removal proceedings truly is—and finding that “only 45% of
immigrants we count as ‘represented’ had an attorney appear at all of their court
hearings”); see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 260, at 26–27
(recommending that representation provided through proposed universal representation
models for individuals in removal proceedings must be “high quality and supported by
adequate resources”); Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study
Report, supra note 122, at 389 (immigration judges surveyed gave a “blistering
assessment” of immigration representation, reporting that half of the time
representation did not meet a “basic level of adequacy”); Careen Shannon, Immigration
is Different: Why Congress Should Guarantee Access to Counsel in All Immigration
Matters, 17 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 165, 200 (2014) (“[T]he representation many licensed
attorneys provide to immigrants is often substandard.”).
271. But see Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court
Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1274 (2010) (arguing that the movement to extend
universal representation to the civil arena is deeply misguided and instead, pro se court
reform would be a more effective and realistic solution); Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand
Side Reform in the Poor People's Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 751 (2015) (critiquing
calls for full legal representation in the civil setting as impractical and unlikely to
substantially improve fairness for unrepresented individuals in the civil context). The
Author would note that the statistics on the positive effects of representation in
immigration court are more persuasive than those regarding pro se and represented
litigants in other civil contexts.
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to engage in training and engaging the wider legal community in
handling these often complex—but incredibly compelling—cases.272
c. Outreach and Information Sharing with Asylum Seekers
To facilitate increased representation rates for asylum seekers,
and, in the absence of representation, to ensure knowledge and
understanding of the one-year bar, attorneys and advocates must
mobilize to reach asylum seekers.273 Because the recent policy change
does nothing to remedy the lack of notice of the one-year bar, asylum
seekers must be informed of their obligation to file an asylum
application within one year after arrival.
This outreach and education could be achieved through a number
of measures. Various non-profit organizations across the country have
implemented pro se I-589 Application for Asylum lodging, or now,
filing workshops.274 Attorneys could explore offering consultations for
pro se asylum seekers at a reduced fee, or partnering with non-profit
organizations to participate in I-589 filing workshops. Advocacy groups
and those working with asylum seekers should take action to publicize
the deadline and the rule change to maximize the number of asylum
seekers informed of the deadline and their opportunity to file their
application at the court window.275

272. These efforts are already underway. In particular, the new Center of
Excellence, led by Stephen Manning and supported by others, focuses on “changing the
ecosystem” for asylum adjudication at difficult jurisdictions for asylum seekers, piloting
in Atlanta, Georgia, by providing robust training and mentoring for attorneys handling
asylum cases. See Center of Excellence: Core Asylum Curriculum, INNOVATION LAW
LAB,
https://innovationlawlab.org/center-of-excellence/
[https://perma.cc/QK46MUAD] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
273. Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to
Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE
45, 60–61 (2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/service-delivery-resourceallocation-and-access-to-justice-greiner-and-pattanayak-and-the-research-imperative
[https://perma.cc/5AYK-UGHE] (stating that self-help reforms and court simplification
efforts have become more than a “stopgap” and, in the absence of access to counsel,
have “become significant features of the access to justice landscape in their own
right”).
274. These organizations include CARECEN, Los Angeles; Casa Marianella,
Austin; U.N. Local, New York; Allegra Love, Santa Fe; the San Francisco Immigrant
Legal & Education Network, San Francisco; New Sanctuary Coalition of NY, New
York City; and Tahirih Justice Center’s Houston office. See E-mail from Michelle
Mendez, Training & Legal Support Staff Att’y, Catholic Legal Immigration Network,
Inc., to author (Sept. 27, 2016, 1:17 PM) (on file with author).
275. Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC) is putting together a
pro se resource sheet following the Sept. 14, 2016 EOIR rule change in Spanish to
assist asylum seekers in navigating the new rule. See id.
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CONCLUSION

The shortage of pro bono resources and the crisis in representation
for many individuals and families seeking asylum protection urges a
more comprehensive solution than the simple and limited policy change
announced by EOIR in September 2016. A sweeping statutory fix
eliminating the one-year deadline to apply for asylum, while an ideal
solution, seems untenable in the current political climate. Likewise, an
immediate resolution of the immigration court backlog is unlikely.
Averting an avoidable humanitarian disaster, therefore, depends on
quick action by EOIR and USCIS to implement the administrative and
regulatory solutions proposed in this Article, which will maximize the
positive impact of the already-announced EOIR September 2016 policy
change. Leaving the system in disarray with no uniformity in decisionmaking on this issue throughout the nation is simply unacceptable.
Unless this problem is resolved, the United States government risks
leaving otherwise-eligible asylum seekers with inadequate protection
and no path to integration. Failure to give this population of
individuals, who will likely never be able to return to their country of
origin, the opportunity to integrate creates insecurity for individuals
who deserve a meaningful second chance in life and an opportunity to
contribute to and benefit from participation in American society.
Simply put, DHS, including USCIS and EOIR, must immediately
begin issuing advisals regarding the requirement to file for asylum
within one year to any individual who makes it clear that he or she
intends to seek asylum and comes to the attention of one of the
agencies. EOIR must further take steps to remedy the inequity they
have inadvertently created for pro se versus represented asylum
seekers. These steps include issuing clear instructions for immigration
judges regarding lack of notice combined with the lack of a hearing
prior to one year. EOIR must make clear these two factors combined
constitute an extraordinary circumstance, and, further, that expressing a
fear of return or undergoing a credible fear interview should deem an
individual’s application for asylum filed for one-year bar purposes. In
the long-term, DHS and EOIR should initiate the process of amending
their regulations to enumerate additional extraordinary circumstance
exceptions to the one-year deadline. This should include an exception
for an asylum seeker who lacked notice of the deadline and a court
hearing scheduled within one year. Failing these additional steps to be
taken by government agencies, advocates and attorneys must work to
increase asylum seekers’ knowledge of the one-year filing deadline and
the new mechanics for meeting that deadline. These concrete and
entirely feasible measures will avoid thousands of asylum seekers
facing the same fate as Liana and Yesenia, who remain in limbo
awaiting further review of the erroneous initial decisions in their cases.

